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Abstract
Weconsider the problem of specifying and verifying cryptographic security protocols for XMLweb
services. The security speciﬁcation WS-Security describes a range of XML security elements, such
as username tokens, public-key certiﬁcates, and digital signatures, amounting to a ﬂexible vocabulary
for expressing protocols. To describe the syntax of these elements, we extend the usual XML data
model with symbolic representations of cryptographic values. We use predicates on this data model
to describe the semantics of security elements and of sample protocols distributed with the Microsoft
WSE implementation of WS-Security. By embedding our data model within Abadi and Fournet’s
applied pi calculus, we formulate and prove security properties with respect to the standardDolev–Yao
threat model. Moreover, we informally discuss issues not addressed by the formal model. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst approach to the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of security protocols
based on a faithful account of the XML wire format.
© 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: XML security; Applied pi calculus; Web services
1. Motivations and outline
Over the past few years, a growing list of speciﬁcations has been deﬁning aspects of
XML web services. Security is a serious concern and is addressed, in particular, by the
recent WS-Security standard [32]. WS-Security provides an XML vocabulary for design-
ing cryptographic protocols and by now has multiple implementations. Still, it provides no
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formal basis for stating security goals or reasoning about correctness. The trouble is, new
cryptographic protocols are often ﬂawed, XML or no XML.
Meanwhile, there has been a sustained and successful effort to develop formalisms for
expressing and verifying cryptographic protocols ([8,12,13,22,25,27,35,39], etc). Formal
methods can verify various security properties against a standard threat model based on
an opponent able to monitor and manipulate messages sent over the network. Such veriﬁ-
cations are typically of abstract versions of protocols, expressed using ﬁxed, high-level,
ad hoc message formats, rather than the standard XML syntax for ordered trees with
pointers.
This paper brings these developments together. We introduce a language-based model
for XML security protocols, and we establish process calculus techniques for verifying
authentication properties for a wide class of WS-Security protocols.
1.1. Background: Web services security
Web services [41] are a distributed systems technology based on network endpoints
exchanging SOAP [9] envelopes—XML documents with a mandatory Body element con-
taining a request, response, or fault element, together with an optional Header element
containing routing or security information. SOAP allows for network intermediaries—such
as routers or ﬁrewalls—to process an envelope, by adding or modifying headers. Exam-
ples of web services include Internet-based services for ordering goods or invoking search
engines, and intranet-based services for linking enterprise applications.
A common technique for securing SOAP exchanges is to rely on a lower-level secure
tunnel between the endpoints, typically an SSL connection. This works well in many situa-
tions, but has the usual disadvantages of transport-level security: the secrecy or integrity of
messages can be guaranteed while in the tunnel, but not subsequently in ﬁles or databases,
and they may not match the security requirements of the application. Pragmatically, client
authentication is often performed by the application rather than by SSL. Besides, SSL does
not ﬁt SOAP’s message-based architecture: intermediaries cannot see the contents of the
tunnel, and so cannot route or ﬁlter messages.
To better support end-to-end security [36], WS-Security deﬁnes how to sign or encrypt
SOAPmessageswithout relying on a secure transport.A central—but informal—abstraction
is the security token, which covers data making security claims, such as user identiﬁers,
cryptographic keys, or certiﬁcates.WS-Security provides a precise syntax formultiple token
formats, such as XML username tokens and XML-encoded binary tokens conveying X.509
public-key certiﬁcates or symmetric keys. It also speciﬁes syntax for applying encryption
and signature to selected elements of SOAP messages. In this paper, we use the term token
to refer to all security elements deﬁned in WS-Security, including identity tokens, digital
signatures, and encrypted blocks. Like many traditional protocol speciﬁcations, WS-Secu-
rity details message formats—such as the names of XML tags—rather than security goals
and their enforcement, thereby focusing on interoperability rather than security.Although it
gives a syntax for a broad range of protocols, WS-Security also emphasizes ﬂexibility, and
does not deﬁne any particular protocol. As a result, for each given WS-Security compliant
protocol, security goals still have to be carefully speciﬁed and validated.
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1.2. Background: Security protocol veriﬁcation
This paper addresses authentication properties of XML-based security protocols against
a standard threat model: an opponent able to read, replay, redirect, and transform messages,
but who cannot simply guess secrets. Needham and Schroeder describe such an opponent
in their pioneering work on cryptographic protocols [33]. The ﬁrst formalization was by
Dolev andYao [18]. A great many formal methods have been deployed to verify protocols
against this threat model, with particular progress in the past few years.
This paper uses Abadi and Fournet’s applied pi calculus [1,2] as the underlying speciﬁ-
cation language for protocols, and relies on proof techniques from concurrency theory. In
this approach, the opponent is simply an arbitrary context within the calculus; the scoping
rules of the pi calculus ensure that the opponent cannot learn names representing secrets
such as the passwords of protocol participants.
We formalize authentication properties using standard correspondence assertions [42],
as embedded within the pi calculus by Gordon and Jeffrey [22]. These assertions are based
on two kinds of events, which can be thought of as logﬁle entries by protocol participants.
A begin-event marks the initiation of a run of a protocol, while an end-event marks the
commitment that a run has completed. Events record data identifying the run, such as the
names of the client and server, message identiﬁer, and payload.A protocol is safe if in every
run, every end-event corresponds to a previous begin-event with the same event record.
Moreover, a protocol is robustly safe if it is safe in the presence of an arbitrary opponent
process. Robust safety establishes message authentication, and rules out a range of attacks.
Other formulations of authentication are possible; see [21] for a comparative study.
1.3. This paper
We tackle the problem of formal reasoning about XML-encoded cryptographic protocols.
The interest and novelty in this problem arises not from the XML syntax itself, but from
the need to model low-level detail, in particular, the ﬂexibility and hierarchical structure of
XML signatures [20], designed to tolerate changes to the headers of a SOAP message over
its lifetime.
Webase our approach on three formalisms: a symbolic syntax forXMLwith cryptography
and a predicate language for deﬁning acceptable messages—both deﬁned in Section 2—and
a specialized version of the applied pi calculus. We explain the purpose of each of these
in turn.
First, to represent XML messages with embedded cryptography, we enrich the standard
XML data model with an abstract syntax for embedded byte arrays and cryptographic
functions. Formally, we deﬁne a many-sorted algebra with sorts for the usual constructs of
XML—strings, attributes, and so on—plus a new sort of symbolic byte arrays, in the style
of Dolev andYao, to represent cryptographic materials embedded in XML.
Second, to deﬁne the semantics of security tokens and validity conditions on messages,
we introduce a Prolog-like language of predicates on XML data. By insisting on ﬁdelity to
the low-level XML format, we are confronted with the difﬁculty of deﬁning rather intricate
conditions of message acceptability, and hence we need some language of predicates on
XML. It may be possible to extend some standard type system or query language for XML
K. Bhargavan et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 102–153 105
(such as DTDs, XML Schema, or XPath) to express conditions on cryptographic values.
Instead, for the sake of simplicity and being self-contained, we rely on a fairly standard
Horn-clause logic.
Third, to describe complete protocols,we embed thesemessages and predicateswithin the
applied pi calculus. We state and prove protocol properties against a large class of contexts
representing attackers. Applied pi is parameterized in general by an arbitrary equational
theory of terms, which we specialize to our data model for XML with cryptography. We
obtain a calculus expressive enough to implement our predicates, and to describe complex
protocol conﬁgurations.
In Section 3, given these notations, we formalize the security goals and message for-
mats of a series of sample protocols. These protocols illustrate a range of WS-Security
concepts including message identiﬁers, password digests, username tokens, X.509 public-
key certiﬁcates, XML signatures based on both password-derived keys and certiﬁcates,
and processing by SOAP intermediaries as well as end-points. For each protocol, we give
predicates describing acceptable messages, and state authentication goals using the usual
message-sequence notation. WS-Security itself deﬁnes a formal syntax for messages, but
gives only an informal account of the security checks performed by compliant implementa-
tions, as each token is processed in the SOAP protocol stack. Through formalizing the series
of protocols, we accumulate a collection of re-usable predicates reﬂecting the semantics
of these tokens. Hence, we obtain a ﬁrst formal semantics for a signiﬁcant fragment of
WS-Security.
In Section 4, we formalize the message-sequence notation within the applied pi calculus
so as to verify our authentication goals. We explain the structure of the proof of three of the
sample protocols from Section 3. The proofs are compositional, and rely on identifying a
“trusted computing base” embodying the essential checks underlying the protocol.
In Section 5, we conclude, and discuss related and future work.
Appendix A is a brief introduction to the applied pi calculus. Appendix B contains addi-
tional proofs. A portion of this article is published as a conference paper [5]. A technical
report [6] contains additional details.
1.4. Contributions
In summary, we make three main contributions:
(1) A new data model and predicate language for describing XML-level cryptographic
protocols. Fidelity to the detailed messaging format enables us to address its subtleties,
such as the interpretation of compound signatures.
(2) A collection of predicates deﬁning a semantics for the security tokens of WS-Security
and related speciﬁcations. We cover only a substantial fragment of WS-Security, but
our semantics does establish the feasibility of applying our formal developments to a
large class of protocols.
(3) Proofs for a series of concrete protocols drawn from the WSE 1.0 distribution. At an
abstract level, the protocols we consider are quite simple. Still, we have encountered
vulnerabilities to XML rewriting attacks in implementations of these conceptually sim-
ple protocols. So it is worth establishing correctness at this level, and indeed the formal
Dolev–Yao properties are non-trivial.
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2. Symbolic cryptography in XML
The core of our data model—or abstract syntax—for XML trees is adapted from Siméon
and Wadler’s grammar for XML [38].
XML data model: standard core
Tag ::= anyLegalXmlName element or attribute name
str :string ::= any legal XML string XML string
a :att ::= Tag="str" Tag-attribute
as :atts ::= a as |  attribute sequence
i : item ::= Elem | str item
is : items ::= i is |  item sequence
Elem ::= <Tag as>is</Tag> Tag-element
Our data model represents valid, parsed XML. It resembles the XML infoset recommen-
dation [14] but with some differences. For the sake of clarity, we completely suppress
information about XML namespaces, and the document <?xml ... > directive. As a mi-
nor technical convenience, we model an element’s attributes as an ordered sequence rather
than a set. (This also reﬂects the capability of an attacker to observe ordering information.)
Our syntax is intentionally close to the standard XMLwire format, but for brevity we rely
on three notational conventions. First, although formally an element’s attributes as and body
is are recursively deﬁned lists, we typically use a standard tuple notation for ﬁxed-length
sequences. Second, instead of writing an element <Envelope></Envelope>, say, in
full, we drop the tag from the closing bracket, and simply write <Envelope></>. Third,
when writing an element that spans several lines, we rely on indentation (as in Haskell or
Python) to delimit the body, and so omit the closing bracket. So, by convention,
<Envelope>
<Header></>
<Body></>
is short for
<Envelope><Header></Header><Body></Body></Envelope>.
Conventions for sequences, for closing and indenting elements
a1 . . . am
= a1 (. . . (am )) :atts for m0; similarly for items.
<Tag as>is</> = <Tag as>is</Tag>
<Tag as>
i1
...
im


= <Tag as>i1 · · · im</>
Formally, our data model is a many-sorted algebra, based on the sorts string, att, atts,
item, items, plus a sort bytes for binary data. We embed this algebra within the applied pi
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calculus as described in Section 4. The complete algebra is given by the “XML data model”
table above plus two more below.
We need the following general deﬁnitions. We let T, U, V range over terms of arbitrary
sort in the algebra, and write T : string, for example, to mean that T belongs to the sort
string. Throughout we assume that terms, predicates, and equations are well sorted, but for
the sake of brevity keep the details implicit. In addition to the syntax deﬁned in this section,
terms include sorted variables, x, y, z, . . ., and so on. We let fv(T ) be the set of variables
occurring in a term T. We say a term T is closed if and only if fv(T ) = . Otherwise,
we say the term is open—an open term represents a closed term with some undetermined
subterms, represented by the variables. We let V˜ range over vectors V1, . . . , Vm of terms,
and similarly x˜ ranges over vectors x1, . . . , xm of variables. We often treat such vectors as
sets. We let  range over parallel substitutions {˜x = V˜ } of the terms V˜ for the variables x˜,
and we deﬁne dom({˜x = V˜ }) = {˜x}. We say that a substitution  is closed if and only if
(x) is a closed term for each x ∈ dom().
Next, we supplement the core data model with a symbolic representation of cryptography
and related operations.We introduce a sortbytes representing byte arrays, and extend string
with Base64-encoded arrays (base64(x)). We assume there is an inﬁnite set of atomic,
abstract names, ranged over by s. Each name is either of sort bytes or string. We use these
names to represent arbitrary, unstructured cryptographic materials such as passwords and
keys. We let fn(T ) be the set of names occurring in a term T.
XML data model: byte arrays, symbolic cryptography
x :bytes ::= byte array (not itself XML)
s abstract name (key, nonce)
concat(x1, x2 :bytes) array concatenation
c14n(i : item) canonical bytes of an item
utf8(str :string) UTF8 representation of strings
sha1(x :bytes) cryptographic digest
p-sha1(pwd :string, salt :bytes) key from salted password
hmac-sha1(key, x :bytes) keyed hash
pk(kpriv :bytes) map from private-to-public key
rsa-sha1(x, kpriv :bytes) public key signature
x509(sr :bytes, u :string, a :string, kpub :bytes)
X.509 certiﬁcate
str :string ::= XML string
s abstract name (password)
base64(x :bytes) Base64-encoding of byte array
principal(pwd :string) map from password to principal
While the cryptographic functions presented here are all present in theWS-Security speciﬁ-
cation, the exact choice of primitives is a little arbitrary; we include enough operations here
for the protocols of Section 3. The term concat(x1, x2) represents the concatenation of the
two arrays x1 and x2. The term c14n(i) represents the array obtained by canonicalizing the
XML represented by i, according to some standard algorithm [10,11]. (In fact, for our pur-
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poses, c14n is simply a way of symbolically treating anXML item as a byte array; our c14n
does not sort attribute lists, for example.) The term utf8(str) represents the UTF8 encoding
of the XML string str. The term sha1(x) represents the one-way SHA1 hash of the x array.
The term p-sha1(pwd,salt) represents a key obtained by hashing the pwd password and the
salt array [17]. The term hmac-sha1(key, x) represents a keyed hash of the x array using
the key array as the key [26]. The term pk(kpriv) represents the public key associated with
a private signing key kpriv. The term rsa-sha1(x, kpriv) is a public-key signature of x under
the private key kpriv [24]. The term x509(sr , u, a, k) represents a basic X.509 public-key
certiﬁcate, where sr is the private signing key of the certiﬁer and u, a, k are the signed user
name, algorithm, and key for a given principal. (Such binary certiﬁcates can be embedded
as XML items; they are used here to carry public keys for the asymmetric signing algorithm
rsa-sha1.) Finally, the term principal(pwd) is used to represent a database of user names
associated with secrets, such as passwords, and is explained in Section 3.2.
Our threat model is that SOAP messages may be intercepted, decomposed, modiﬁed, as-
sembled, and replayed by the attacker [18,33]. The following selector functions and inverses
symbolically represent the ability of the attacker to decompose messages. It is deliberate
that there are no inverses for the three hash functions (sha1, p-sha1, and hmac-sha1),
and for the public-key (pk) and user name (principal) maps; the attacker cannot reverse
these one-way functions.
XML data model: selectors and inverses
x :bytes ::= byte array
fst(x :bytes) left part of concat
snd(x :bytes) right part of concat
i-base64(str :string) inverse of base64
x509-key(cert :bytes) public key in X.509 certiﬁcate
check-x509(cert, kr :bytes) X.509 certiﬁcate veriﬁcation
check-rsa-sha1(x, sig, kpub :bytes) public key veriﬁcation
str :string ::= XML string
Tag.parm(a :att) string param of a Tag-attribute
i-utf8(x :bytes) inverse of utf8
x509-user(cert :bytes) name in X.509 certiﬁcate
x509-alg(cert :bytes) algorithm in X.509 certiﬁcate
a :att ::= attribute
hd(as :atts) head of a sequence
as :atts ::= attributes
Tag.att(i : item) attributes of a Tag-element
tl(as :atts) tail of a sequence
i : item ::= item
hd(is : items) head of a sequence
i-c14n(x :bytes) inverse of c14n
is : items ::= items
Tag.body(i : item) body of a Tag-element
tl(is : items) tail of a sequence
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Most of these selectors are straightforward inverses with single arguments. The two excep-
tions are check-x509 and check-rsa-sha1. The term check-x509(cert, kr) checks that the
certiﬁcate cert is signed with a private key associated with the public key kr , and yields kr
if this succeeds. The term check-rsa-sha1(x, sig, kpub) checks that sig is the rsa-sha1
signature of x under the private key corresponding to the public key kpub and yields kpub if
this succeeds. (Some of the inverses, such as the functions fst and snd, would be impossible
to implement in general, and we do not rely on them to program compliant principals; they
exist to represent the possibility of the attacker correctly guessing, for example, how to
divide an array obtained by concatenation into its original two halves.)
We represent evaluation of selectors and inverses by an equivalence, U = V , the least
sort-respecting congruence induced by the following axioms.
Equivalence of terms of the data model: U = V
hd(a as) = a tl(a as) = as
hd(i is) = i tl(i is) = is
Tag.att(<Tag as>is</>) = as i-base64(base64(x)) = x
Tag.body(<Tag as>is</>) = is i-utf8(utf8(str)) = str
Tag.parm(Tag="str") = str i-c14n(c14n(i)) = i
fst(concat(x1, x2)) = x1 snd(concat(x1, x2)) = x2
x509-user(x509(sr, u, a, k)) = u x509-alg(x509(sr, u, a, k)) = a
x509-key(x509(sr, u, a, k)) = k
check-x509(x509(sr, u, a, k),pk(sr)) = pk(sr)
check-rsa-sha1(x, rsa-sha1(x, kpriv),pk(kpriv)) = pk(kpriv)
In the absence of additional equivalences between terms, we implicitly assume that our
cryptographic operations have no additional interactions. For instance, the hash functions
sha1, p-sha1, hmac-sha1, and rsa-sha1 are independent here. This can be informally
checked from their cryptographic speciﬁcations [19,17,26,24], or modelled as a reﬁnement
of the term equivalence, as in [1].
We end this section by deﬁning a logical notation for predicates on XML terms. Formally,
we present a Horn logic over our many-sorted algebra, with primitive formulas for equality
and list membership, but no recursively deﬁned predicates. Our notation is simple, and
sufﬁces for reasoning about security; other languages feature more expressive pattern-
matching for XML, but their semantics would be harder to formalize.
We assume there is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set of predicates, ranged over by p. For each predicate p,
we assume there is a single deﬁnition p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨m, where each i is a formula,
and m > 0. (When m > 1, we usually present each clause p(˜x) :- i separately, in the
style of Prolog.) Next, we deﬁne the syntax of formulas.
Syntax of formulas and predicate deﬁnitions
 ::= formula
V = T term comparison
U ∈ V list membership
110 K. Bhargavan et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 102–153
p(V˜ ) predicate instance
1,2 conjunction
p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨ m deﬁnition of predicate p with m > 0
We assume that formulas are well-sorted according to the following rules: in V = T both
terms belong to the same sort; in U ∈ V either U : item and V : items or U : att and
V : atts; in p(V˜ ) when p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨m, the length and sorts of V˜ match the length
and sorts of x˜.
Let p contribute to q if and only if an instance p(V˜ ) occurs in one of the disjuncts
deﬁning q. We stipulate that this relation is well-founded, to avoid recursively-deﬁned
predicates.We let fv() be the free variables of all the terms occurring in, and in particular,
fv(p(V1, . . . , Vm)) = fv(V1) ∪ · · · ∪ fv(Vm). In any clause p(˜x) :- , we say that each
z ∈ fv()\ x˜ is a local variable. By convention, each occurrence in a clause of the wildcard
symbol is short for the only occurrence of a fresh local variable. Local variables are
existentially quantiﬁed in our semantics; we identify clauses up to the consistent renaming
of local variables.
Semantics of formulas:   where fv() = 
 V = T = (V = T )
 U ∈ V = (V = U1 . . . Ui U V ′)
for some U1, …, Ui , V ′, with i0
 p(V˜ ) =  i {˜x = V˜ }{˜z = U˜}
for some i ∈ 1 . . . m and closed terms U˜
where p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨ m and z˜ = fv(i ) \ x˜
 1,2 =  1 and  2
For open formulas, we introduce notions of validity and logical equivalence.
Validity, logical equivalence of formulas
A formula  is valid when, for all substitutions  such that  is closed,  .
Two formulas , ′ are logically equivalent when, for all substitutions  such that
 and ′ are closed,   iff  ′.
3. Example protocols
This section describes someWS-Security protocols, whose goal is to authenticate access
to a basic web service.We ﬁrst present a typical (unauthenticated) web service, then succes-
sively reﬁne it by introducing password-based digests, signatures, X.509 certiﬁcates, and
a ﬁrewall intermediary. The ﬁrst four protocols are taken from the samples provided with
WSE 1.0 [30]; we used the actual SOAP messages produced by this implementation to ex-
perimentally validate our model. (The technical report includes sample messages produced
by WSE.)
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3.1. An (unauthenticated) web service
We consider a typical e-commerce website application where customers can browse
and purchase items [29]. The orders are stored on a database server, and can be retrieved
and viewed on later visits. For security, customers are required to login, with username and
password, before placing and retrieving orders. In addition to the standard website interface,
the server provides a SOAP web service GetOrder that a customer may invoke to retrieve
their order in XML format, to save it as a receipt, for instance. Our aim is to provide the
same level of security for this web service as the website login.
A call to GetOrder consists of a SOAP request and a SOAP response. We introduce
predicates to describe these messages. As a ﬁrst example, a valid SOAP message is an
XML Envelope, containing a Header and a Body. The predicate hasBody(e, b) below
means b is the body of envelope e (the wildcard matches anything):
hasBody(e : item, b : item) :-
e = <Envelope><Header> </>b</>,
b = <Body > </>.
The SOAP request for GetOrder is an envelope, where the body encodes the parameters of
the call. The resulting SOAP response has a body containing the order, in XML
isGetOrder(b : item,OrderId : string) :-
b = <Body >
<GetOrder>
<orderId>OrderId</>
isGetOrderResponse(b : item,OrderId : string, u : string) :-
b = <Body >
<GetOrderResponse>
<orderId>OrderId</>
<date> </>
<userId>u</>
.
We suppose there is a single server, identiﬁed by the URL S, hosting the GetOrder web
service, identiﬁed by the URIW, and multiple client computers that may connect to S on
behalf of users. Here is a protocol for a client computer, identiﬁed by its IP address I, to
request information about order number OrderId from the web service W on server S, on
behalf of a human user u.
Message 1: I → S,W e,
where hasBody(e, b), isGetOrder(b,OrderId).
Message 2: S → I e′,
where hasBody(e′, b′),
and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u′).
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• Message 1 is an HTTP POST request to the URL S, with an HTTP header
SOAPAction: W, and with the SOAP envelope e as its content. The predicates
hasBody(e, b) and isGetOrder(b,OrderId) specify the behaviour of both client and
server: that is, a client will only send Message 1, and a server will only accept it, if the
message e is a suitably formatted request for some order OrderId. We implicitly specify
that if the server receives a message that does not satisfy these predicates, it will reject the
message.
• Message 2 is the HTTP response, containing the SOAP envelope e′. The predicates
hasBody(e′, b′) and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u′) constrain the server to send a
reply that concerns the order OrderId requested in Message 1. In this ﬁrst protocol, the
user u whose client computer sends the request need not be the same as the user u′ who
is associated with the order.
It is not a goal here to fully specify the correct behaviour of either client or server. We
are only concerned about security properties, and authentication in particular, and suppress
other information. For example, we suppress the rest of the response, which includes details
such as the credit card type, number and expiration date, billing and shipping addresses,
and the sequence of line items in the order.
Our predicates express constraints on messages sent and received by compliant imple-
mentations of our protocols. On the sender side, they express post-conditions for every
outgoing message. (The fact that these conditions do not fully determine the envelope
yields functional ﬂexibility.) On the receiver side, they express pre-conditions that must be
checked before incoming messages are processed. (They do not specify a particular order
for the checks, but still provide enough details to review an implementation.) In the presence
of an active attacker, it is essential that the receiver dynamically check these conditions,
even if the sender enforces them.
Our ﬁrst protocol offers no protection against active attacks, since any well-formed en-
velope is accepted by the server. Next, we consider more effective checks.
3.2. Password digest
Username tokens with a cryptographic digest provide a ﬁrst, basic mechanism for authen-
ticating web service requests. Such tokens include a username identity u, together with a
digest of a password and a fresh timestamp.We assume that each password pwdu is a shared,
unguessable secret between u and S, so that only u (or S, in principle) can generate a valid
digest—this hypothesis excludes dictionary attacks, for instance. To justify this assumption,
passwords need to be strong cryptographic secrets; one might also modify the protocol to
encrypt the digest of a weak password, but we do not pursue this alternative. Moreover, as
in other applications of the applied pi calculus, we abstractly relate the password and the
user using the special one-way function principal from passwords to users: we let u stand
for principal(pwdu).
To model this protocol, we develop predicates for describing WS-Security headers and
embedded username tokens. Our predicate deﬁnitions are not speciﬁc to this protocol,
and can be re-used for any protocol relying on these tokens. First, we deﬁne a predicate
to extract the security tokens from some security header of the envelope: the predicate
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks) means that toks is a sequence of security tokens attached to
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message e. The ﬁrst formula in the predicate body extracts the list of headers (headers :
items) from the envelope. The second formula, header ∈ headers, requires that header be
somemember of the header list. The third formula requires that header be a security header,
and extracts the security tokens from it.
hasSecurityHeader(e : item, toks : items) :-
e = <Envelope><Header>headers</> </>,
header ∈ headers,
header = <Security>toks</>.
The WS-Security speciﬁcation allows envelopes to contain multiple <Security> ele-
ments, possibly containing SOAP role attributes, provided each <Security> element
in an envelope is targeted at a distinct endpoint or intermediary. For the sake of simplicity,
hasSecurityHeader ignores <Security> elements containing this attribute, and does not
check for duplicate <Security> elements.
With username tokens, the unique identiﬁer of a message is a pair (n : bytes, t : string)
where n is a nonce—some byte array—and t is a timestamp represented as a string. The
predicate isDigestUserToken(tok, u, pwd, n, t)means that tok is a username token for user u
with password pwd, identiﬁer (n, t), and a valid digest.
isDigestUserToken(tok : item, u, pwd : string, n : bytes, t : string) :-
tok = <UsernameToken >
<Username>u</>
<Password Type="PasswordDigest">base64(d)</>
<Nonce>base64(n)</>
<Created>t</>,
u = principal(pwd),
d = sha1(concat(n, concat(utf8(t),utf8(pwd)))).
Finally, a top-level authentication predicate, hasUserTokenDigest, gathers all the elements
checked on envelopes received by the server; hasUserTokenDigest(e, u, pwd, n, t, b)means
that the envelope e with body b contains a valid username token for u, pwd, n, t .
hasUserTokenDigest(e : item, u, pwd : string, n : bytes, t : string, b : item) :-
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks),
utok ∈ toks,
isDigestUserToken(utok, u, pwd, n, t),
hasBody(e, b).
The following protocol description includes both SOAPmessages and additional begin- and
end-events, in the style of Woo and Lam [42]. We introduce these events to
express the authentication guarantee obtained by the server from running this protocol.
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(The correspondence between begin- and end-events is sometimes referred to as agreement
between running and commit signals, respectively [28].)
Event 1: I logs <Begin>u n t</>.
Message 1: I → S,W e,
where hasUserTokenDigest(e, u, pwd, n, t, b),
and isGetOrder(b,OrderId).
Event 2: S logs <End>u n t</>
Message 2: S → I e′,
where hasBody(e′, b′),
and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u).
We interpret events in the abstract log as follows: before issuing a request, the initiator logs
its intent as an entry <Begin>u n t</> that contains the user name u and the message
identiﬁer. Conversely, after checking an envelope, the server logs <End>u n t</> to man-
ifest that it accepts a request with these parameters. In any case, the attacker cannot log
entries. Ideally, begin- and end-events should be in direct correspondence, but this is clearly
not the case if the attacker can delete, reorder, or replay u’s messages. Instead, we have the
following correspondence property:
Claim 1. In the presence of an active Dolev–Yao attacker, if <End>u n t</> is logged by
S, then <Begin>u n t</> has been logged by I.
This is a fairly weak authentication property, which can be read as “if S accepts a request
from u, then u recently sent some request.” The two requests are not necessarily the same:
for instance, an active attacker can intercept the envelope, modify its body, and pass it to
the server. In many settings, it may be suitable to have a stronger correspondence between
u and S’s actions, for example between entries <Begin>u S W n t OrderId</> and
<End>u S W n t OrderId</>.
Although the password digest is optional in WS-Security username tokens, our claim
would clearly not hold if the server accepted tokens without checking the digest, since
the attacker could then forge a message with any identiﬁer (n, t) irrespective of the user’s
requests.
In itself, our protocol does not eliminate replays. (Technically, our correspondence as-
sertion is non-injective.) However, since the identiﬁer is authenticated, the application can
safely use it to ﬁlter messages with duplicate or expired username tokens.
3.3. Password-based signature
In order to achieve more precise authentication properties under the same assumptions—
a shared password between u and S—one can use an XML digital signature on selected
elements of the envelope [20]. In addition to the username token,we embed a signature token
that signs (for instance) the envelope body, with a signing key derived from the password
and the username token.
K. Bhargavan et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 102–153 115
A hash-based signature of items x1, . . . , xm using a key k, may be roughly pictured as
follows.
<Signature>
<SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm=" . . . normalization scheme . . ."></>
<SignatureMethod
Algorithm=" . . . keyed hash function . . ."></>
<Reference> . . . hash of x1 . . .</>
. . .
<Reference> . . . hash of xm . . .</>
<SignatureValue>
. . . hash of SignedInfo element with key k . . . .
See Section 4.3 for a full example of a signed envelope. Next, we deﬁne the additional
predicates needed for our modiﬁed protocol, including predicates deﬁning the various parts
of a signature.
• isUserTokenKey(tok, u, pwd, n, t, k) means that tok is a username token for user u with
password pwd, unique identiﬁer (n, t), and derived key k. The key derivation uses a
p-sha1 keyed hash salted with the message identiﬁer.
• isSigVal(sv, si, k, a) means that sv is the digital signature computed on item si with key
k using algorithm a (which for password-based signatures is hmac-sha1).
• ref(t, r) means that the item r is a reference containing the digest of item t. (We use the
three wildcards tomatch reference attributes and Transforms and DigestMethod
elements, which are included in references for ﬂexibility, but are irrelevant for security
in our setting.)
• isSigInfo(si, a, x1, . . . , xm)means that the signed information si, for signature algorithm
a, contains a list of references of which the ﬁrst m are for the items x1, . . . , xm. After
these references, si may contain any number of references to other items (represented in
the predicate by an ). This ﬂexibility in the predicate enables the client to sign additional
items even if not required by the server (to conform to a uniform send policy, for example).
• isSignature(sig, a, k, x1, . . . , xm) means that the signature sig signs x1, . . . , xm with
algorithm a and veriﬁcation key k.
• hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b) is the top-level predicate. It means that the enve-
lope e contains a username token for u, pwd, n, t , and that the body b of e is signed by
the key derived from the token.
isUserTokenKey(tok : item, u, pwd : string, n : bytes, t : string, k : bytes) :-
tok = <UsernameToken >
<Username>u</>
<Nonce>base64(n)</>
<Created>t</>,
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u = principal(pwd),
k = p-sha1(pwd, concat(n,utf8(t))).
isSigVal(sv : bytes, si : item, k : bytes, a : string) :-
a = hmac-sha1,
sv = hmac-sha1(k, c14n(si)).
ref(t : item, r : item) :-
r = <Reference >
<DigestValue>base64(sha1(c14n(t)))</>.
(for each m1)
isSigInfo(si : item, a : string, x1, . . . , xm : item) :-
si = <SignedInfo>
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="a"></>
r1 . . . rm ,
ref(x1, r1), . . . , ref(xm, rm).
isSignature(sig : item, a : string, k : bytes, x1, . . . , xm : item) :-
sig = <Signature>si <SignatureValue>base64(sv)</> </>,
isSigInfo(si, a, x1, . . . , xm),
isSigVal(sv, si, k, a).
hasUserSignedBody(e : item, u, pwd : string, n : bytes, t : string, b : item) :-
hasBody(e, b),
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks),
utok ∈ toks,
isUserTokenKey(utok, u, pwd, n, t, k),
sig ∈ toks,
isSignature(sig,hmac-sha1, k, b).
The message exchange is much as in Section 3.2, with two differences: each log entry
now contains u n t OrderId instead of just u n tOrderId; we use the top-level predi-
cate hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b) instead of hasUserTokenDigest(e, u, pwd, n,
t, b).
Event 1: I logs <Begin>u n t OrderId</>
Message 1: I → S,W e
where hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b),
and isGetOrder(b,OrderId)
Event 2: S logs <End>u n t OrderId</>
Message 2: S → I e′
where hasBody(e′, b′),
and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u).
We obtain a similar, but stronger authentication property
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Claim 2. In the presence of an active Dolev–Yao attacker, if <End>u n t OrderId</> is
logged by S, then <Begin>u n t OrderId</> has been logged by I.
This claim can be read as “if S accepts a request from u, then u recently sent this request.”
Although only b is signed, the username u and the identiﬁer (n, t) are also authenticated
by the signature check. As before, we can rely on (n, t) for replay protection. Since the
identiﬁer is now bound to the message, the server can safely use it to ﬁlter duplicate or
expired messages.
We make two observations concerning these predicates. First, isUserTokenKey does not
check the presence or validity of the optional username token digest. In fact, checking
the password digest would not provide any additional authentication guarantee here. Con-
versely, its (potential) occurrence in the envelope slightly complicates our proofs in Sec-
tion 4. Arguably, the initiator should not include both a digest and a signature, since this
may facilitate a dictionary attack on the password, unless it does not know which evidence
will be considered by the server.
Second, although each reference r typically provides a pointer to the digested element,
either as a fragment URI or as an XPath expression, we do not rely on this information in
the ref predicate. Instead, we check that the actual itemwe are interested in—the body b—is
targeted by the reference. In general, this approach is preferable, since it leaves the resolution
of pointers outside the trusted computing base. Otherwise, one should also carefully check
that these pointers are well-deﬁned and unambiguous.
Our speciﬁcation captures the ﬂexibility of WS-Security signatures. The predicates for
key derivation (isUserTokenKey) are independent from those interpreting the signature. So,
we can compose isSignature with some other keying material, such as an X.509 certiﬁcate.
Similarly,we can support additional algorithms for computing the actual signature by adding
alternatives to the predicate isSigVal—see Section 3.4.
Furthermore, isSignature allows additional elements of themessage to be signed. Signing
the username, nonce, or timestamp elements is not necessarywith this particular signing-key
derivation, but is harmless, and becomes necessarywith other kinds of keys (see Section 3.5).
In case there are several actions on the same server, or if the same password is shared with
two different (honest) servers, then the path header (S,W) should also be signed (as in the
next section). Otherwise, the attacker might redirect an envelope from one web service to
another.
3.4. X.509 signature
The next protocol does not depend on password-based authentication. Instead, it uses
public-key signatures based on X.509 certiﬁcates. We assume that the user u has a pub-
lic/private key pair and keeps the private key secret. We also assume that u and S agree on
the public key kr of some X.509 certiﬁcation authority, and that this authority issued only
one certiﬁcate for u, with u’s public key.
In contrast with password-based signatures, X.509 signature tokens cannot use fragments
of the username token as message identiﬁer. Instead, they can sign the globally unique
identiﬁer included in the path header of our SOAPmessages, as deﬁned inWS-Routing [34].
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This is reﬂected by the following additional predicates:
• isX509Token(tok, kr , u, a, k) means that tok is a binary token that contains a certiﬁcate
x509(sr , u, a, k) with certiﬁer’s public key kr = pk(sr ).
• isSigVal(sv, si, k, a) is extended with a clause that checks signatures using the rsa-sha1
algorithm.
• hasPathHeader(e, ac, to, id, ea, et, ei) means that envelope e has a path header with
action ac, destination to, and message identiﬁer id in elements ea, et, and ei, respectively.
• hasX509SignedBody(e, kr , u, ac, to, id, b, ea, et, ei) is the top-level predicate. It means
that the envelope e has an X.509 token for u certiﬁed by kr whose public key signs the
body b and a path header ea, et, ei containing ac, to, id.
isX509Token(tok : item, kr : bytes, u : string, a : string, k : bytes) :-
tok = <BinarySecurityToken >base64(xcert)</>,
check-x509(xcert, kr ) = kr ,
u = x509-user(xcert),
a = x509-alg(xcert),
k = x509-key(xcert).
isSigVal(sv : bytes, si : item, k : bytes, a : string) :-
a = rsa-sha1, check-rsa-sha1(c14n(si), sv, k) = k.
hasPathHeader(e : item, ac, to, id : string, ea, et, ei : item) :-
e = <Envelope><Header>headers</> </>,
header ∈ headers,
header = <path >ea et ei</>,
ea = <action >ac</>,
et = <to >to</>,
ei = <id >id</>.
hasX509SignedBody(e : item, kr : bytes, u, ac, to, id : string,
b, ea, et, ei : item) :-
hasBody(e, b),
hasPathHeader(e, ac, to, id, ea, et, ei),
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks),
xtok ∈ toks,
isX509Token(xtok, kr , u,rsa-sha1, k),
sig ∈ toks,
isSignature(sig,rsa-sha1, k, b, ea, et, ei).
Themessage exchange for the X.509 signature protocol is almost the same as the one in Sec-
tion 3.3, with two differences. First, the contents of the log entries is now uW S id OrderId
(instead ofun t OrderId). Second,we use the top-level predicate hasX509SignedBody(e, kr ,
u,W, S, id, b, ea, et, ei) instead of hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b). The predicate
checks ac =W and to = S in the path header by uniﬁcation.
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Event 1: I logs <Begin>uW S id OrderId</>.
Message 1: I → S,W e,
where hasX509SignedBody(e, kr , u,W, S, id, b, ea, et, ei),
and isGetOrder(b,OrderId).
Event 2: S logs <End>uW S id OrderId</>.
Message 2: S → I e′,
where hasBody(e′, b′),
and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u).
We now obtain the authentication property
Claim 3. In the presence of an active Dolev–Yao attacker, if <End>uW S id OrderId</>
is logged by S, then <Begin>uW S id OrderId</> has been logged by I.
This claim can be read as “if S accepts a request from u, then u, at some point, sent this
request to S.” So by signing the path header, we obtain an additional authenticity guarantee
as regards u’s intended target (S,W), and thus prevent some redirection attacks. One can
easily implement replay protection using the authenticatedmessage identiﬁer.This supposes
that clients do generate globally unique identiﬁers (although this is not actually required to
obtain our correspondence property). Alternatively, one may use a custom unique identiﬁer
in the envelope body.
3.5. Firewall-based authentication
By specifying the structure of security tokens, rather than their use, WS-Security en-
courages a ﬂexible approach to web service security. For instance, a server may naturally
accept both password-based and X.509-based signatures for authentication, leaving that
choice to the client. This ﬂexibility yields useful compositional properties in our formal
developments. For instance, a web service that runs both protocols is formally equivalent
to two web services in parallel, one for each authentication mechanism.
In this section, we illustrate this ﬂexibility with a different composite architecture that
chainsWS-Security authentication schemes along aWS-Routing path. In addition to a server
S and a client I acting on behalf ofu, we consider an intermediate SOAP-level ﬁrewallF . The
ﬁrewall holds the password database, has theX.509 certiﬁcate and the corresponding private
key for certiﬁcate user f, and is responsible for authenticating access to S (and possibly other
servers). The client I sends a GetOrder request with a password-based signature (for u) to
S via F . The path header indicates to F that the message is intended for S. The ﬁrewall F
checks the password-based signature, adds a new firewall header indicating that it has
authenticated u, signs the message using f’s X.509 certiﬁcate, and forwards the message to
S. The server S expects an X.509 signature from a particular ﬁrewall with certiﬁcate user
name f. S checks the X.509 signature and certiﬁcate, and thus it authenticates the original
sender u without knowledge of u’s password.
Next, we deﬁne (predicates on) the message forwarded by the ﬁrewall. To indicate to the
server that it has checked the credentials of the user, the ﬁrewall adds a new ﬁrewall header
containing the username token, but with the password digest deleted. It then embeds an
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X.509 signature that includes this header as well. The predicates for this message are:
• isFirewallHeader(h, u, n, t) means that the element h is a ﬁrewall header with the user-
name token u, n, t .
• hasFWHeader(e, h, u, n, t)means that the envelope e has a ﬁrewall header hwith u, n, t .
• hasX509SignedBodyFw(e, kr , f, u, n, t, b) is the top-level predicate checked by the
server. It means that the envelope e has a ﬁrewall header with u, n, t , a body b, and
that the ﬁrewall header and the body are signed with a valid certiﬁcate for f issued by kr .
isFirewallHeader(h : item, u : string, n : bytes, t : string) :-
h = <firewall >utok</>,
utok = <UsernameToken>
<Username>u</>
<Nonce>base64(n)</>
<Created>t</>.
hasFWHeader(e, h : item, u : string, n : bytes, t : string) :-
e = <Envelope ><Header>headers</> </>,
h ∈ headers,
isFirewallheader(h, u, n, t).
hasX509SignedBodyFw(e : item, kr : bytes, f, u : string,
n : bytes, t : string, b : item) :-
hasBody(e, b),
hasFWHeader(e, h, u, n, t),
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks),
xtok ∈ toks,
isX509Token(xtok, kr , f,rsa-sha1, p),
sig ∈ toks,
isSignature(sig,rsa-sha1, p, b, h).
The protocol involves three messages, as follows:
Event 1: I logs <Begin>u n t OrderId</>.
Message 1: I → F,W e,
where hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b).
Message 2: F → S,W e′,
where hasX509SignedBodyFw(e′, kr , f, u, n, t, b)
and isGetOrder(b,OrderId).
Event 2: S logs <End>u n t OrderId</>.
Message 3: S → I e′′,
where hasBody(e′′, b′)
and isGetOrderResponse(b′,OrderId, u).
In terms of the SOAP speciﬁcation, the two envelopes e and e′ represent two stages in
the lifetime of the same message: it is sent by the client endpoint, updated by the ﬁrewall
intermediary, and received by the server endpoint.
K. Bhargavan et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 340 (2005) 102–153 121
Claim 4. In the presence of an active Dolev–Yao attacker, if <End>u n t OrderId</>
is logged by S, then <Begin>u n t OrderId</> has been logged by I.
Thus, we obtain the same end-to-end authenticity guarantee as with the password-based
signature protocol of Section 3.3, but for a different implementation that does not require S
to know u’s password. We prove this claim by composing the correspondence property for
the password-based signature in Message 1 with that for the X.509 signature in Message 2.
4. A pi calculus semantics
In order to formalize and validate the claims of Section 3, we specify the behaviour of
the participants (and in particular their implementation of predicates) as processes in the
applied pi calculus.We refer toAppendixA for a brief overview of the calculus and its main
notations, and to [1] for its semantics. Here, we use the sorts, terms, and equations described
in Section 2, with coercion functions from strings to items, and with additional sorts for
communication channels [31]. (However, in our model, channels do not appear in terms
of other sorts, nor in messages sent on channels.) We always assume that terms, formulas,
processes, and contexts are well-sorted, but usually keep sort information implicit.
This section divides into the following parts. Section 4.1 describes our computational
interpretation of formulas as certain non-deterministic processes in the applied pi calcu-
lus. Section 4.2 introduces formal notions of robust safety—that embedded correspondence
assertions hold in spite of the presence of an attacker—and functional adequacy—that a
protocol may run to successful completion in the absence of an attacker. Section 4.3 uses
these deﬁnitions to state results about the password-based signature protocol of Section 3.3.
Theorem 8 asserts that a process formalizing this protocol is robustly safe—Claim 2 is
a corollary. Moreover, Theorem 9 asserts the formalization is functionally adequate. Sec-
tion 4.4 breaks the proof of Theorem 8 into two halves: ﬁrst, the deﬁnition and proof of
correctness of a simpler, core protocol; second, the proof that the correctness of the core
protocol implies Theorem 8. Section 4.5 describes how to generalize our results to conﬁgu-
rations with multiple servers and users. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 state and prove similar robust
safety properties for the protocols of Sections 3.4 (with X.509 signatures) and 3.5 (with
an intermediate ﬁrewall), respectively; we obtain Claims 3 and 4 as corollaries. We do not
include a proof of Claim 1, concerning the weak protocol of Section 3.2 that uses password-
digests.We conjecture that a proof could be obtained by adapting and simplifying the proof
of Theorem 8, concerning the stronger protocol that uses password-based signatures (and
still supports password-digests).
4.1. Interpretation of formulas
We describe a (partial) implementation of our logic in the applied pi calculus. We induc-
tively deﬁne processes of the form ﬁlter  → y˜ in P , where the variables y˜ are bound in
P and get assigned to terms making the formula  true. When the formula is an equality
V = T we assume that one of the terms is known, and that the other can be treated as a
pattern, matching variables to known subterms in the known term. In the following formal
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deﬁnitions, we always assume that V is the known term, and that T is the pattern, but in
our example predicates we allow either of the terms to be the pattern. For a pattern to be
implementable, there must be an inverse term for each bound variable, able to compute the
value of the variable from the known term.
Patterns
The equality V = T binds variables y˜ with pattern T, written V = T → y˜, when (1)
y˜ ⊆ fv(T ) \ fv(V ), and (2) T has inverse terms S˜, with fv(S˜) ⊆ {x}, fn(S˜) = ,
and, for all terms U, W˜ , if U = T {y˜ = W˜ }, then W˜ = S˜{x = U}.
For instance, the pattern base64(y) has inverse S = i-base64(x); for all V and W, if
V = base64(W) thenW = S{x = V } = i-base64(base64(W)). On the other hand, the
pattern sha1(y) has no inverse, and therefore would not satisfy point (2).
The following table is the partial inductive deﬁnition of ﬁlter  → y˜ in P . If such a
process is deﬁned by the following rules, we say that the formula  is implementable with
bound variables y˜. When ﬁlter  → y˜ in P is deﬁned and closed, we intend that it seeks
closed terms V˜ such that  {y˜ = V˜ }, and acts as P {y˜ = V˜ }. Lemma 5 makes this precise.
Formula implementation: ﬁlter  → y˜ in P when y˜ ⊆ fv()
ﬁlter V = T → y˜ in P =
let y˜ = S˜{x = V } in if V = T then P
when V = T → y˜ with inverse terms S˜
ﬁlter x ∈ V → x in P =
s, c.(c(x).P | s〈V 〉 | !s(z).ﬁlter z=h t → h, t in (c〈h〉 | s〈t〉))
when x ∈ fv(V ) and with {s, c} ∩ fn(P ) = 
ﬁlter p(V˜ ) → y˜ in P =
s.(s〈〉 |∏i∈1...m s( ).ﬁlter i {˜x = V˜ } → y˜, z˜i in P)
when p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨ m, s /∈ fn(P )
and, ∀i ∈ 1 . . . m,fv(i ) = x˜ unionmulti z˜i and (fv(V˜ ) ∪ fv(P )) ∩ z˜i = 
ﬁlter 1,2 → y˜ in P =
ﬁlter 1 → (y˜ ∩ fv(1)) in (ﬁlter 2 → (y˜ \ fv(1)) in P)
When V = T → y˜, with inverse terms S˜, the implementation ﬁlter V = T → y˜ in P binds
the variables y˜ of the pattern T to components of the term V, and veriﬁes that hence the
pattern matches the term. If so, the match succeeds, and P runs. Otherwise, the match fails,
and the implementation deadlocks.
When x /∈ fv(V ), the implementation ﬁlter x ∈ V → x in P outputs V on a fresh
channel s, and runs the process !s(z).ﬁlter z=h t → h, t in (c〈h〉 | s〈t〉) which binds h =
V1 and t = V2 . . . Vm , provided V = V1 V2 . . . Vm  with m1, then outputs h on c,
and t on the fresh channel s. The effect of this replication is to output each of the terms
V1, . . . , Vm on the fresh channel c. The process c(x).P is the only listener on c; so the
outcome is P {x = Vi} for one i ∈ 1 . . . m. If, in fact,V is the empty list, the implementation
deadlocks.
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When p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨ m, the implementation ﬁlter p(V˜ ) → y˜ in P generates a
separate process s( ).ﬁlter i {˜x = V˜ } → y˜, z˜i in P for each clause i ∈ 1 . . . m, where z˜i
are the local variables for clause i. We make an internal choice of which to run by arranging
all to listen on the fresh channel s, on which only a single message is sent.We are assuming
that y˜ ⊆ fv(V˜ ), which with the side-condition fv(i ) = x˜ unionmulti z˜i , yields that fv(i {˜x =
V˜ }) = fv(V˜ ) unionmulti z˜i for each i. Therefore, the formula implementation ﬁlter i {˜x = V˜ } →
y˜, z˜i in P satisﬁes the well-formedness condition y˜, z˜i ⊆ fv(i {˜x = V˜ }). Moreover, the
side-condition fv(P )∩ z˜i =  guarantees there is no confusion between the local variables
z˜i and any variables in P.
The implementation ﬁlter 1,2 → y˜ in P works by evaluating 1 then 2 before
running P.
As an example, we show an implementation of hasBody(e, b):
ﬁlter hasBody(e, b) → b in [-]
= s.(s〈〉 | s( ).
ﬁlter e = <Envelope><Header>y1</>b</> → y1, b in
ﬁlter b = <Body y2>y3</> → y2, y3 in [-])
= s.(s〈〉 | s( ).
let y1 : items = Header.body(hd(Envelope.body(e))) in
let b : item = hd(tl(Envelope.body(e))) in
if e = <Envelope><Header>y1</> b </> then
let y2 : atts = Body.att(b) in
let y3 : items = Body.body(b) in
if b = <Body y2>y3</> then [-]).
To state the correctness of the embedding of our logic within the applied pi calculus, we
appeal to the following notion of internal choice. We write →∗ for a series of reduction
steps and ∼ for strong bisimilarity, the strong form of observational equivalence [1]. For
any set of processes X, we co-inductively deﬁne the set of processes
⊕
X that are internal
choices of X:
Internal choice:
⊕
X
A process Q is an internal choice on X, writtenQ ∈⊕X, if and only if
(1) if P ∈ X thenQ→∗∼ P ;
(2) ifQ→ Q′, then eitherQ′ ∼ P with P ∈ X orQ′ ∈⊕Y with Y ⊆ X; and
(3) Q does not communicate on free channel names.
Lemma 5. If ﬁlter  → y˜ in P is deﬁned and closed then
ﬁlter  → y˜ in P ∈ ⊕{P {y˜ = V˜ } | fv(V˜ ) =  ∧  {y˜ = V˜ }}.
The proof appears in Appendix B.
4.2. Safety properties, functional properties
To formalize the authenticity properties claimed in Section 3, we mark the progress of
the client and server processes with begin- and end-events, represented as message outputs
on the channels begin and end, respectively. Hence, our authenticity properties become
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non-injective correspondence assertions [42] between messages. We write ≈ for (weak)
observational congruence in applied pi. Further, to capture the occurrence of events, we
deﬁne a derived notion of observation of messages on free channels
Event occurrence: A a〈V 〉
A outputs the term V on channel a, written A a〈V 〉, when A ≈ a〈V 〉 | A′.
Much as in Gordon and Jeffrey’s formulation of correspondence assertions [22], we deﬁne
safety and robust safety: a process is safe if every end-event has a matching begin-event,
and is robustly safe if it is safe in the presence of any opponent.
Safety and robust safety
A is safe if and only if, whenever A→∗ B, B end〈V 〉 implies B begin〈V 〉.
A is robustly safe if and only if, for all evaluation contexts E[-] where the channels begin
and end do not occur, E[A] is safe.
Intuitively,E[-] represents any active attacker (in the applied pi calculus) that controls both
the network and the client application behaviour;A is the initial conﬁguration of the protocol
being considered; B represents any reachable state of the protocol, after interleaving any
number of sessions; and robust safety guarantees that, whenever a new end-event appears
in B, one can also observe a matching begin-event in B.
(We formulate robust safety in terms of a reduction-based semantics [1] and represent
events as ordinary message outputs. In contrast, others, such as Gordon and Jeffrey [22],
formulate robust safety in terms of traces of begin- and end-events. The different formula-
tions lead to slightly different properties. For instance, begin〈V 〉 | end〈V 〉 is robustly safe
in our setting but not in that of Gordon and Jeffrey, since we observe both messages simul-
taneously whereas they observe a trace with the end-event preceding the begin-event. These
appear to be superﬁcial differences in formulating the same underlying intuition—that every
end-event is matched by a begin-event.)
In addition to security properties such as robust safety, one should check that the protocol
works as intended and may indeed succeed, at least in the absence of an attacker. The
following deﬁnition captures this intent for a process A that begins the protocol for V:
Functional adequacy
A is functionally adequate for V when A→∗ B with B end〈V 〉 for some B.
If a process is not functionally adequate for any V, then robust safety may hold vacuously,
if for example no begin- or end-events are reachable. On the other hand, if a process is both
robustly safe and functionally adequate, there is at least one run in which an end-event is
reachable, with a matching begin-event.
The next lemma states that our main security properties can be established using the
theory of observational equivalence in the applied pi calculus.
Lemma 6. SupposeA ≈ B. If A is robustly safe then so is B. Moreover, if A is functionally
adequate for V then so is B.
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Proof. For robust safety, assume E[B] →∗ B ′ end〈V 〉 for some evaluation context E[-]
that does not contain begin or end. We have E[A] ≈ E[B] (by context-closure of ≈),
E[A]→∗A′withA′ ≈ B ′ (byweak simulation),A′ end〈V 〉(since≈preserves end〈V 〉),
A′ begin〈V 〉 (by robust safety of A), and thus B ′ begin〈V 〉 (since ≈ preserves
 begin〈V 〉).
For functional adequacy, assume A →∗ A′ end〈V 〉. From A ≈ B we get B →∗ B ′
with A′ ≈ B ′ and thus B ′ end〈V 〉. 
Moreover, logical equivalence, when lifted to processes, also preserves robust safety.
Logical equivalence of processes
Two processes are logically equivalent when they differ only in their choices of imple-
mentable, logically equivalent formulas.
Lemma 7. Logical equivalence preserves robust safety.
The proof appears in Appendix B.3.
4.3. Stating password-based authentication
We are now ready to formulate and prove Claim 2 of Section 3.3 for envelopes with
password-based signatures, with or without a password digest. For the sake of simplicity,
we focus on protocol conﬁgurations Q with a single user u, with initiator process Iu and
a single server Su that share a secret password with that user, represented as a restricted
name spwd . The two parts of the protocol also share a communication channel, http. Since
http is not restricted, an environment that encloses Q can also read, modify, and write any
SOAP message.
Protocol conﬁgurations: Q (parameterized by Envelope)
Q = spwd .
({u = principal(spwd)} | Iu | Su)
Iu
= !initu(n, t, b).(begin〈u n t b〉 | http〈Envelope〉)
Su
= !http(e).ﬁlter hasUserSignedBody(e, u′, spwd, n, t, b)
→ u′, n, t, b in end〈u′ n t b〉
The initiator, Iu, repeatedly receives high-level requests on a control channel initu. Using
that control channel, the environment can thus initiate any number of requests on behalf of
u, for any terms N,TS, B. These requests are deemed genuine: they are echoed on channel
begin. The process Iu is also parameterized by a term Envelope that determines the actual
SOAP envelopes constructed and sent by the initiator.
The server, Su, repeatedly receives low-level envelopes on channel http, ﬁlters them
using the top-level predicate deﬁned in Section 3.3 (one easily checks that this predicate
is implementable) and ﬁnally sends a message on channel end for each accepted envelope.
(More generally, we would represent a server that accepts requests from users u1, . . . , um
as a parallel composition
∏
i∈1...m Sui .)
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The scope restriction on spwd models our secrecy assumption on the password, essentially
supposing that it is a strong secret shared between the initiator and the server and used only
in this kind of envelope.
The active substitution {u = principal(spwd)} binds the variable u to the expression
principal(spwd), and exports u (but not spwd ) to the environment.
Crucially, we do not want our robust safety result to depend on every detail of the enve-
lope. Instead, we express minimal requirements as follows:
Safe envelopes
A safe envelope is a term of the form Envelope = T, for any terms T and SI such that
spwd /∈ fn(T , SI) and isSigInfo(SI,hmac-sha1, b) is valid, with the active substitution
 deﬁned by:

= {d = sha1(concat(n, concat(utf8(t),utf8(spwd)))),
sv = hmac-sha1(p-sha1(spwd, concat(n,utf8(t))), c14n(SI))}
To elaborate, as regards safety properties, Envelope may be any XML term, as long as the
password occurs at most in the digest and signature values. Similarly, most of the subterms
in the signature information are irrelevant for safety, even if they happen to be signed
in SI.
Theorem 8. For any safe envelope, the conﬁguration Q is robustly safe.
From this theorem and the deﬁnition of isGetOrder(b, orderId), we easily derive the
more speciﬁc claim of Section 3.3. We devote Section 4.4 to the proof of Theorem 8.
For functional adequacy, the structure of the envelope is more constrained. For example,
T and SI can be instantiated as follows:
T
= <Envelope>
<Header>
<Security>
<UsernameToken Id="utoken">
<Username>u</>
<Password Type="PasswordDigest">
base64(d)
<Nonce>base64(n)</>
<Created>t</>
<Signature>
SI
<SignatureValue>base64(sv)</>
<KeyInfo>
<SecurityTokenReference>
<Reference URI="#utoken"></>
b
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SI
= <SignedInfo>
<CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="c14n"></>
<SignatureMethod Algorithm="hmac-sha1"></>
<Reference URI="#body">
<Transforms>
<Transform Algorithm="c14n"></>
<DigestMethod Algorithm="sha1"></>
<DigestValue>base64(sha1(c14n(b)))</>.
Theorem 9. The envelope Twith T and SI deﬁned above is safe and, for any ground terms
N : bytes, TS : string, B : item with B = <Body Id="body"> </>, the conﬁguration
initu〈N,TS, B〉 | Q with that envelope is functionally adequate for the term u N TS B.
Proof. We easily check that T is a safe envelope and that
 hasUserSignedBody(T,principal(spwd), spwd,N,TS, B)
Then we apply Lemma 5. We obtain
init〈N,TS, B〉 | Q →→ (→∗∼) begin〈u N TS B〉 | end〈u N TS B〉 | Q
with two communication steps (on initu and http) followed by the reduction steps and
equivalence of condition (1) of internal choice (in some evaluation context). 
Conversely, by Theorem 8, if we have both initu〈N,TS, B〉 | Q→∗A and also
A end〈u′ N ′ T ′ B ′〉, then A begin〈u′ N ′ T ′ B ′〉 and, since a single message is sent
on begin, we obtain that u′, N ′, T ′, B ′ = u,N,TS, B.
4.4. Proving password-based authentication
We now present a proof of Theorem 8. An intuition behind the proof is that the security
property relies only on a few elements in the envelope. For instance, the signature bytes are
sufﬁcient for authentication, whereas the other elements in the envelope only provide the
server with (untrusted) hints to verify the signature. Hence, to establish robust safety, we
rely on a stronger, more speciﬁc lemma about a core protocol that explicitly deals only with
these bytes.
The proof is in two stages. First, we show how the password-based signature protocol can
be decomposed into a “core protocol” that deals with authentication and an XML wrapper.
The XML wrapper has no access to the password, and need not be trusted: formally, it
becomes part of the hostile environment. We show that it is enough to prove robust safety
for the core protocol (Lemma 11). In the second stage, we prove that the core protocol itself
is robustly safe (Lemma 15) by exhibiting an invariant on its reachable states (Lemma 14).
We decompose
hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b) → u, n, t, b
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into two implementable formulas
hasUserSignatureEvidence(e, u, n, t, b, sv, si) → u, n, t, b, sv, si,
checkEvidence(sv, si, u, pwd, n, t, b) → 
hasUserSignatureEvidence parses the envelope and extracts the bits that are needed to verify
the signature; it has no access to the password. All the checks related to authentication are
contained in checkEvidence. These predicates are deﬁned by
checkEvidence(sv : bytes, si : item, u, pwd : string, n : bytes,
t : string, x1, . . . , xm : item) :-
isSigInfo(si,hmac-sha1, x1, . . . , xm),
u = principal(pwd),
k = p-sha1(pwd, concat(n,utf8(t))),
isSigVal(sv, si, k,hmac-sha1).
isUserToken(tok : item, u, n : bytes, t : string) :-
tok = <UsernameToken >
<Username>u</>
<Nonce>base64(n)</>
<Created>t</>.
hasUserSignatureEvidence(e : item, u : string, n : bytes, t : string,
b : item, sv : bytes, si : item) :-
hasBody(e, b),
hasSecurityHeader(e, toks),
utok ∈ toks,
isUserToken(utok, u, n, t),
sig ∈ toks,
sig = <Signature >si <SignatureValue>base64(sv)</> </>.
We verify the correctness of this decomposition in terms of logical equivalence:
Lemma 10. The two formulas
hasUserSignedBody(e, u, pwd, n, t, b) and
hasUserSignatureEvidence(e, u, n, t, b, sv, si), checkEvidence(sv, si, u, pwd, n, t, b)
are logically equivalent.
Proof. The two formulas are equal up to a permutation of conjunctive clauses with disjoint
variables. 
Using this decomposition, we deﬁne the core protocol conﬁgurationQ◦, a counterpart of
Q for the simpler predicate checkEvidence that binds no variables, and for replicated pro-
cesses I ◦u and S◦u that communicate with the environment on channels c and s, respectively,
instead of channel http.
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Core protocol conﬁgurations: Q◦ (parameterized by SI)
Q◦[-] = spwd .
({u = principal(spwd)} | I ◦u | S◦u | [-])
I ◦u
= !initu(n, t, b).(begin〈u n t b〉 | c〈d, sv, SI, u, n, t, b〉)
S◦u
= !s(sv, si, u′, n, t, b).ﬁlter checkEvidence
(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b) →  in end〈u′ n t b〉
We write Q◦ for Q◦[0] (the initial state of the core protocol).
Lemma 11 shows that this core protocol is logically equivalent, under an evaluation
context, to the original protocol. This implies that if Q◦ is robustly safe, so is Q.
Lemma 11 (XML /core). For any safe envelope, there exists an evaluation context EQ[-]
where the names begin, end do not occur and a process Q• logically equivalent to Q such
that Q• ≈ EQ[Q◦].
Proof. For a given safe envelope, T, with SI replaced by si, we let Q• be Q up to the
logical equivalence of Lemma 10 and let EQ[-] be the evaluation context
EQ[-] = c, s.


[-] |
!c(d, sv, si, u, n, t, b).http〈T〉 |
!http(e). ﬁlter hasUserSignatureEvidence(e, u′, n, t, b, sv, si)
→ u′, n, t, b, sv, si in s〈sv, si, u′, n, t, b〉


for some c, s /∈ fn(T ). EQ[Q◦] differs from Q• in two ways
(1) Instead of Iu, there is an extra communication on channel c after computing d and si,
but before sending messages on begin and http.
(2) Instead of Su, there is an extra communication on channel s after checking hasUser
SignatureEvidence but before checking predicate checkEvidence.
Since c and s are both restricted channels used only either for asynchronous outputs or as
a single replicated input, these extra communication steps do not affect ≈. 
To prove robust safety for the core protocol, we ﬁrst deﬁne the valid states of the core
protocol in an evaluation context. Valid states are our correctness invariant. They describe
protocol states reachable fromQ◦ after unfolding n sessions, in which no secrets have been
leaked and only messages sent by the client have been accepted by the server.
Valid states for the core protocol
(1) i is adapted from in the deﬁnition of safe envelopes with variables di, svi, ni, ti , bi
and term SIi instead of d, sv, n, t, b and SI.
(2) A session state is a process of the form
Bi = begin〈u ni ti bi〉 | i | Ji,
where Ji is any parallel composition of processes from {end〈u ni ti bi〉} ∪⊕{end〈u ni ti bi〉} ∪⊕{}. (Ci has free variables u, ni, ti , bi and deﬁned variables
di, svi .)
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(3) An internal state is a parallel composition of session states C = ∏i<m Ci , for some
m0.
(4) A valid state is a closed process of the formA = E[Q◦[C]]whereE[-] is an evaluation
context where begin and end do not occur and C is an internal state.
For a given internal state C, let C be the (ordinary) substitution obtained by composing
{u = principal(spwd)} and each i for i < m. By deﬁnition, the frame obtained from
Q◦[C], which represents the attacker’s knowledge about spwd , is C = spwd .C . We
consider the effect of C on the predicate checkEvidence in Lemma 13, to follow. First, we
develop some basic properties of our equational theory on terms.
Our equational theory is deﬁned as the term-rewriting systemobtained from the (oriented)
rewrite rules of Section 2. We give some basic deﬁnitions and results for this system.
Redex, normal form, selector
A termT is a redex for the (oriented) rewrite ruleV = W whenT isV  for some substitution
. Then,W is the result of the rewriting.
A term T is in normal form when it contains no redex for any rule; it is a normal form of
V when V = T .
A function symbol f is a selector when there is a rewrite rule of the form f(V˜ ) = W .
Lemma 12. (1) Every term has a unique normal form.
(2) Two terms are equal if and only if their normal forms are identical.
(3) Suppose f is one of the function symbols sha1, hmac-sha1, p-sha1, or principal. If
terms U and f(V˜ ) are in normal form, and f(V˜ ) does not occur as a subterm of U, then
U{x = f(V˜ )} is also in normal form.
(4) If f(U˜) = g(V˜ ), then either f or g is a selector, or f = g and U˜ = V˜ .
(5) If f(U˜) = g(V˜ ), where U˜ , V˜ are normal, then either
(a) f = g and (U˜ = V˜ ), or
(b) f(V˜ ) is a redex, or
(c) g(W˜ ) is a redex.
Proof. Let U → V be the reduction relation obtained by orienting our equations on
terms from left to right, and closing under contexts. By standard rewriting techniques [4],
our equational theory is the reﬂexive, transitive, symmetric closure of U → V . Whenever
U → V thenV has fewer function symbols thanU, so → is terminating. Our term rewriting
system has no critical pairs; each selector symbol appears only as the outermost symbol in a
rule, and no two rules directly overlap. Given that the reduction relation is terminating and
has no critical pairs, it follows that it is conﬂuent. Since → is terminating and conﬂuent,
it follows that (1) every term has a unique normal form, and (2) two terms are equal if and
only if their normal forms are identical.
For (3), suppose f(V˜ ) is not a subterm of U, that both are normal, and that f ∈ {sha1,
hmac-sha1,p-sha1,principal}. Then substituting the term f(V˜ ) for x in U cannot create
any redexes, since f does not occur in any rewrite rule, and moreover, since f(V˜ ) does not
already occur in U, we cannot complete a redex for either of the selectors check-x509 and
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check-rsa-sha1 guarded by an implicit term equality. Hence, U{x = f(V˜ )} is in normal
form.
For (4), suppose f(U˜) = g(V˜ ) and that neither f nor g is a selector. The normal forms of
f(U˜) and g(V˜ )must take the form f(U˜ ′) and g(V˜ ′), since neither f nor g is a selector. These
two normal forms must be identical, so it follows that f = g and U˜ ′ = V˜ ′, and hence that
U˜ = V˜ .
For (5), suppose f(U˜) = g(V˜ ) where U˜ and V˜ are normal. If either f(U˜) or g(V˜ ) is a
redex we are done. If neither is a redex, they are two equal normal forms and therefore f = g
and (V˜ = W˜ ). 
The next lemma states that if a message is received in a valid state of the protocol, and it
satisﬁes the predicate checkEvidence, then it must have been sent by the client.
Lemma 13 (checkEvidence is safe). Let C be an internal state with m0 sessions. Let ′
be a substitution that ranges over open terms where the name spwd does not appear such
that  = ′ | C is closed. If
 checkEvidence(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b)
then there exists i < n such that (u′, sv, si, n, t, b = u, svi, SIi, ni, ti , bi).
Proof. Assume  checkEvidence(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b), and let ◦C be such that  ≡
′ | ◦C and ◦C ranges over closed terms in normal forms. (Hence, dom(◦C) = dom(C) ={u} ∪ {svj , dj |j < m} and, for all x ∈ dom(C), x◦C = x.)
By deﬁnition,  checkEvidence(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b) implies there exists ′′ with
dom(′′) = {k, c, r1, uri, talg, dalg, rest} such that:
 (u′ = principal(spwd))′′, (1)
 (k = p-sha1(spwd, concat(n,utf8(t))))′′, (2)
 (sv = hmac-sha1(k, c14n(si)))′′, (3)
 (si = <SignedInfo>
c <SignatureMethod Algorithm="hmac-sha1"></>
r1 rest)′′,
(4)
 (r1 = <Reference uri>
talg dalg
<DigestValue>base64(sha1(c14n(b)))</>)′′.
(5)
In (1), we use the deﬁnition of C to introduce u and obtain (u′ = u).
Using (2) to eliminate k in (3), we obtain
sv = hmac-sha1(p-sha1(spwd, concat(n,utf8(t ))), c14n(si )). (6)
Let T = sv ′ in normal form.We have sv  = T ◦C and, by Lemma 12(3) and deﬁnition of
◦C , T ◦C is also in normal form. By plain structural matching on normal forms, we obtain
four cases for T :
• T = x for some x ∈ dom(◦C) such that x◦C = hmac-sha1( , ), where stands
for any subterm. By deﬁnition of ◦C , this implies x = svi for some i < k, and thus
(sv = svi).
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• T = hmac-sha1(x, ) for some x ∈ dom(◦C) such that x◦C = p-sha1( , ). This is
excluded by deﬁnition of ◦C .• T = hmac-sha1(p-sha1(x, ), ) for some x ∈ dom(◦C) such that x◦C = spwd . This
is excluded by deﬁnition of ◦C .• T = hmac-sha1(p-sha1(spwd, ), ). This is excluded by hypothesis on ′: since
T = sv ′, we have spwd /∈ fn(T ).
Using the deﬁnition of svi in C , Eq. (6) becomes
hmac-sha1(p-sha1(spwd, concat(ni,utf8(ti))), c14n(SIi ))
= hmac-sha1(p-sha1(spwd, concat(n,utf8(t))), c14n(si ))
and thus Lemma 12(4) yields (si, n, t = SIi, ni, ti). Similarly, using Eqs. (4) and (5) to
eliminate si then r1 in (si = SIi), we obtain an equation of the form
(V {˜x = b, uri, talg, dalg, rest} = V {˜x = bi, urii , talgi , dalgi , resti})
for a term V built only from constructors, we obtain (b = bi) via Lemma 12(4). 
Using this lemma, we can show that all reachable conﬁgurations of the core protocol are
valid states.
Lemma 14 (Invariant lemma). If A is a valid state andA→ T then T ∼ A′ for some valid
state A′.
Proof. Our lemma is stated for a particular deﬁnition of Q◦; however, its proof relies on
the process structure ofQ◦, and is almost parametric in the deﬁnitions of, checkEvidence,
and the message content on initu, c, s, begin, end (as long as Lemma 13 validates these
deﬁnitions).
Let A = E[Q◦[C]] be a valid core protocol state, with internal state C = ∏i<k Ci .
We perform a case analysis on the reduction step A → A′. By deﬁnition of reduction in
applied pi, this step is either a communication or a term comparison. For communication,
we must have A ≡ E′[a〈˜x〉.P | a(˜x).Q] and A′ ≡ E′[P | Q] for some channel name
a, variables x˜, processes P and Q, and evaluation context E′[-]. By deﬁnition of A and
structural equivalence, this implies one of the following cases:
(1) Both the send and receive occur inQ◦[C]: we haveA′ ≡ E[F [P | Q]]withQ◦[C] ≡
F [a〈˜x〉.P | a(˜x).Q]. By deﬁnition of core conﬁgurations, the channels used for com-
munications in evaluation context in Q◦[C] are begin, end—only used for sending—and
initu, s—only used for receiving—plus channel names appearing in internal choices.
By property (3) of internal choices, a is thus a local channel in an internal choice P in
some parallel composition Ji within C. For some C′ and process P ′, we have, for some
internal state P:
C ≡ C′ | P P → P ′ A′ ≡ E[Q◦[C′ | P ′]].
By deﬁnition of Ji , we have P ∈⊕{end〈u ni ti bi〉} ∪⊕{}. By property (2) of internal
choices, we have either P ′ ∼ end〈u ni ti bi〉 (and we let P ′′ = end〈u ni ti bi〉) or P ′ ∈⊕{end〈u ni ti bi〉} ∪⊕{} (and we let P ′′ = P ′). In both subcases, C′ | P ′′ is also an
internal state, and we haveA′ ≡ E[Q◦[C′ | P ′]] ∼ E[Q◦[C′ | P ′′]], which is a valid state.
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(2) Q◦[C] sends a message on a free channel: we have Q◦[C] ≡ F [a〈˜x〉.P ] where a is
free in F [-] and E[Q◦[C]] = E′[a(˜x).P | Q◦[C]]. By deﬁnition of core conﬁgurations,
a ∈ {begin, end}, so this case is excluded by hypothesis on E[-].
(3) Q◦[C] receives a message on channel a ∈ fn(Q◦[C]). Using structural equivalence,
we can assume that the message output occurs in parallel with [-] in E[-], and conveys a
tuple of any variables that do not occur in Q◦[C]. By deﬁnition of core conﬁgurations, we
have either a = initu using the replicated input in I ◦u (case 3a) or a = s using the replicated
input in S◦u (case 3b):
(a) We have a valid state A such that
A ≡ E′[initu〈uk, nk, tk, bk〉.P | Q◦[C]],
Q = begin〈u nk tk bk〉 | c〈dk, svk, SIk, u, nk, tk, bk〉k,
A′ ≡ E′[P | Q◦[C | Q]].
Let Jk = 0 and Ck = begin〈u nk tk bk〉 | k | Jk . By construction, C | Ck is an internal
state with an additional session at index k. Let
F [-] = dk, svk.(c〈dk, svk, SIk, u, nk, tk, bk〉 | [-]) .
Using structural equivalences, we obtain Q ≡ F [Ck], Q◦[C | Q] ≡ F [Q◦[C | Ck]],
and ﬁnally A′ ≡ E′[P | F [Q◦[C | Ck]]], which is a valid state.
(b) We have a valid state A such that
A ≡ E′[s〈sv, si, u′, n, t, b〉.P | Q◦[C]],
Q = ﬁlter checkEvidence(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b) →  in end〈u′ n t b〉,
A′ ≡ E′[P | Q◦[C | Q]].
We ﬁrst use structural equivalence to close the process Q: we have A′ ≡ E′′[′ |
Q◦[C | Q]] valid state, for some evaluation context E′′[-] that does not contain any
active substitution, and thus A′ ≡ E′′[′ | Q◦[C | Q]]. for some  ≡ ′ | C .
Applying Lemma 5, we obtain
Q ∈ ⊕ {end〈u′ n t b〉 |  checkEvidence(sv, si, u′, spwd, n, t, b)}.
Applying Lemma 13, either there exists i < n such that (u′, sv, si, n, t, b = u, svi, SIi,
ni, ti , bi), and thenQ ∈⊕{end〈u ni ti bi〉}, or the predicate is never satisﬁed, and
Q ∈⊕{}.
In the ﬁrst subcase (the message may be accepted), we letC′ = C | Q, check thatC′
is an internal state obtained from C by using J ′i = Ji | Q instead of Ji , and conclude
with A′ ≡ E′′[′ | Q◦[C | Q]], which is a valid state.
In the second subcase (checkEvidence fails), let Q′ ∈ ⊕{} with Q ∼ Q′ and
spwd /∈ fn(Q′) (obtained for instance by substituting a fresh name for spwd in Q). We
have A′ ∼ E′′[′ | Q′ | Q◦[C]], which is a valid state with the same internal state.
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(4) The communication entirely occurs in E[-]: we have a valid state A such that
A ≡ E′[A1 | Q◦[C]], A1 | C → A′1 | C, A′ ≡ E′[A′1 | Q◦[C]].
Moreover, spwd /∈ A1 by hypothesis onE′, so we can pickA′′1 such thatA′1 | C ≡ A′′1 | C
and spwd /∈ A′′1. We conclude with A′ ≡ E′[A′′1 | Q◦[C]] valid state.
Next, we consider comparison steps. Two cases are enabled, depending on the location
of the conditional:
• The test occurs inQ◦[C], necessarily in one of the internal choices: this is another instance
of case 1.
• The test occurs in E[-]: this is another instance of case 4. 
As a corollary, we can show robust safety for the core protocol.
Lemma 15 (Core robust safety). Q◦ is robustly safe.
Proof. We ﬁrst show that, if A a〈V 〉 and a is used only for asynchronous outputs in A,
then A →∗ a〈V 〉 | A′′ ≈ A for some A′′. By deﬁnition, A a〈V 〉 means A ≈ a〈V 〉 | A′
for some A′. Let C = t〈〉 | a(x).if x = V then t () for some fresh name t. We have
C | a〈V 〉 | A′ →3 A′ and thus, by context closure and simulation for ≈, C | A →∗
A′′ ≈ A′ for some A′′. By deﬁnition of C and case analysis on reductions, we obtain
A→∗ a〈V 〉 | A′′. By context closure for a〈V 〉, A′′ ≈ A′ implies a〈V 〉 | A′′ ≈ A.
AssumeE[Q◦] →∗ A end〈V 〉 for some contextE[-]where begin and end do not occur.
Using the remark above, we have E[Q◦] →∗ A →∗ B ≈ A for some B = end〈V 〉 | A′′.
By Lemma 14 and induction on the number of reduction steps, there exists a valid state
B ′ ∼ B. In particular, B ′ contains a message end〈V 〉. By deﬁnition of valid states, this
message may occur only within some session state Ii that also contains begin〈V 〉. Thus,
B ′ begin〈V 〉 and, since B ′ ≈ B ≈ A, we obtain A begin〈V 〉. 
Theorem 8 follows as a corollary. More generally, we could derive robust safety for
conﬁgurations that may use several kinds of safe envelopes.
Restatement of Theorem 8. For any safe envelope, the conﬁguration Q is robustly safe.
Proof. By Lemma 15, Q◦ is robustly safe (RS). By Lemma 11, Q• ≈ EQ[Q◦] and, by
hypothesis onEQ,EQ[Q◦] is RS. ByLemma 6,Q• is RS. Finally,Q• is logically equivalent
to Q, and thus, by Lemma 7, Q is RS. 
4.5. Extended conﬁgurations
In the proofs above, we focused on a simple situation with a single user and a single
server dedicated to that user. Next, we illustrate how this basic result can be easily extended
to conﬁgurations with multiple users and servers.
We ﬁrst state a lemma to compose robust safety properties.
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Lemma 16. (1) If A is robustly safe and E[-] is an evaluation context where begin and end
do not occur, then E[A] is robustly safe.
(2) Let A be a process where begin and end do not occur.
If c.A{a, b = begin, end} and a.A{b, c = begin, end} are robustly safe, then b.A
{a, c = begin, end} is robustly safe.
Proof. (1) By deﬁnition and composition of evaluation contexts.
(2) Assume E[b.A{a, c = begin, end}] →∗ B end〈V 〉, and begin, end, a, b, c do not
occur in E[-] or V (up to a renaming of a, b, c in A). We also have E[A] →∗ B ′ c〈V 〉
with B ≡ b.B ′{a, c = begin, end}. Using the second, then the ﬁrst hypothesis, we also
have B ′ b〈V 〉 and B ′ a〈V 〉, and ﬁnally B begin〈V 〉. 
Theorem 17. LetU be a set of variables and Envelope be a family of safe envelopes indexed
by U . The conﬁguration QU =
∏
u∈U Q is robustly safe.
Proof. Assume E[QU ] →∗ B end〈V 〉 for some evaluation context E[-] that does not
contain begin, end. Let {beginu, endu | u ∈ U} be distinct channel names that do not occur
inE[-]. We deﬁne renamings u = {beginu, endu = begin, end} and  =
∏
u∈U u, and let
Q′ be the conﬁguration∏u∈U (Q−1u ). By deﬁnition,QU is obtained fromQ′ by identifying
event channels for all users, and we have QU = Q′.
Event channels appear inQU only for sendingmessages, and do not appear inE[-], hence
every reduction step inE[QU ] →∗ B commutes with our renamings.We obtainE[Q′] →∗
B ′ endu〈V 〉 for some u ∈ U and B ′ such that B = B ′, and ﬁnally E[Q′u] →∗
B ′u end〈V 〉.
By Theorem 8 and Lemma 16(1), the conﬁguration E[Q′u] is robustly safe, hence
B ′u end〈V 〉 implies B ′u begin〈V 〉 and, since B = B ′, B begin〈V 〉. 
To see that this indeed allows us to consider systems with multiple users, using structural
equivalence, we have QU ≡ (su)u∈U .(I | S) where I =
∏
u∈U ({u = principal(su)} |
Iu) implements a parallel composition of initiators for the users in U (all using distinct
passwords) and S =∏u∈U Su implements a server that accepts requests from any of these
users (with an internal choice of u ∈ U as each envelope is received). Similarly, we could
extend our result to initiators using multiple safe envelope formats for a given user.
In our conﬁgurations so far, whenever the server accepts a message, it only sends an end-
event. The next lemma extends robust safety in case the server performs some additional
processing on accepted messages. (This lemma can be used as a preliminary step before
chaining sub-protocols using Lemma 16; see also Section 4.7 for an application.)
Lemma 18. The conﬁguration Q′ obtained from Q by substituting Q[end〈u′ n t b〉 |
accept〈u′, n, t, b〉] for Q[end〈u′ n t b〉] is robustly safe.
Proof. Using robust safety forQ (Theorem 8), whenever a message is sent on end, we have
u = u′ and the values n, t, b are those received from the environment on initu. By mapping
reductions E[Q′] →∗ A to those of E′[Q] where E′ is E[-] plus messages on accept, we
easily establish that E[Q′] is also safe. 
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4.6. Stating and proving X.509-based authentication
For expressing X.509 conﬁgurations, we model the certiﬁer as a process AI that exports
its own public key kr plus a collection of certiﬁcates for the pairs of users and public keys
(V ,K) ∈ I, signed with the certifying private key, sr . The conﬁguration also includes client
and server processes for a particular user u, with public key ku.
X.509 Signing Protocol Conﬁgurations: Q (parameterized by Envelope,I)
Q = AI | Ku | Su
AI
= sr .
(
{kr = pk(sr )} |∏(V ,K)∈I{xV = x509(sr , V ,rsa-sha1,K)}
)
Ku
= su.({u = principal(su)} | {ku = pk(su)} | Iu)
Iu
= !initu(b, ea, et, ei).(begin〈u b ea et ei〉 | http〈Envelope〉)
Su
= !http(e).
ﬁlter hasX509SignedBody(e, kr , u,W, S, id, b, ea, et, ei)
→ id, b, ea, et, ei in
end〈u b ea et ei〉
As in Section 4, the conﬁgurationQ illustrates a simple protocol conﬁguration. Its deﬁnition
can easily be adapted to deal with more general conﬁgurations. We make the following
assumptions on the contents of certiﬁcates and envelopes:
Safe collections of certiﬁcates: I
I is a ﬁnite set of pairs of terms such that, whenever (V ,K) ∈ I, either (V ,K) = (u, ku),
or fv(V ,K) =  and sr /∈ fn(V ,K).
These conditions guarantee that there is a unique certiﬁcate for u and ku, and that the
certifying key is used exclusively for signing these certiﬁcates.
Safe envelopes with X.509 signing
A safe envelope is a term of the form Envelope = T for any terms T and SI such that
sr , su /∈ fn(T ) ∪ fn(SI) and isSigInfo(SI,rsa-sha1, b, ea, et, ei) is valid, with the
active substitution  deﬁned by:

= {sv = rsa-sha1(c14n(SI), su)}
The structure of the proof is similar to the one detailed in Section 4.4. We ﬁrst decompose
hasX509SignedBody(e, kr , u, ac, to, id, b, ea, et, ei) → id, b, ea, et, ei into the conjunc-
tion
hasX509SignatureEvidence(e, id, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei) → id, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei,
checkX509Evidence(kr , u, ac, to, id, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei) → .
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Here, checkX509Evidence contains all the cryptographic tests to check the certiﬁcate and
the signature:
checkX509Evidence(kr : bytes, u, ac, to, id : string, x, sv : bytes,
si, b, ea, et, ei : item) :-
isX509Cert(x, kr , u,rsa-sha1, k),
isSigVal(sv, si, k,rsa-sha1),
isSigInfo(si,rsa-sha1, b, ea, et, ei),
ea = <action >ac</>,
et = <to >to</>,
ei = <id >id</>.
isX509Cert(x, kr : bytes, u, a : string, k : bytes) :-
check-x509(x, kr ) = kr ,
u = x509-user(x),
a = x509-alg(x),
k = x509-key(x).
Next, we deﬁne core protocol conﬁgurations and their valid states.
X.509 signing core protocol conﬁgurations: Q◦ (parameterized by SI,I)
Q◦[-] = AI | K◦u | S◦u | [-]
K◦u
= su.
({u = principal(su)} | {ku = pk(su)} | I ◦u )
I ◦u
= !initu(b, ea, et, ei).(begin〈u b ea et ei〉 |
c〈id.Body(ei), xu, sv, SI, b, ea, et, ei〉)
S◦u
= !s(id, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei).
ﬁlter checkX509Evidence(kr , u,W, S, id, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei) →  in
end〈u b ea et ei〉
Valid states for the X.509 signing protocol
(1) i is adapted from  in the deﬁnition of safe envelopes with variables
svi, bi, eai, eti , eii and term SIi instead of sv, b, ea, et, ei and SI.
(2) A session state is a process of the form
Ci = begin〈u bi eai eti eii〉 | i | Ji,
where Ji is any parallel composition of processes from {end〈u bi eai eti eii〉} ∪⊕{end〈u bi eai eti eii〉} ∪⊕{}. (Ci has free variables bi, eai, eti , eii and deﬁned
variable svi .)
(3) An internal state is a parallel composition of session states C = ∏i<m Ci , for some
m0.
(4) A valid state is a closed process of the formA = E[Q◦[C]]whereE[-] is an evaluation
context where begin and end do not occur and C is an internal state.
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For a given internal state C, let 1C be the (ordinary) substitution obtained by composing
{kr = pk(sr )} and each {xV = x509(sr , V ,rsa-sha1,K)} for (V ,K) ∈ I; let 2C be
obtained by composing {u = principal(su)}, {ku = pk(su)} and each i for i < m. Let
C = 1C | 2C . By deﬁnition, the frame obtained from Q◦[C], which represents the
attacker’s knowledge about su, is C = sr .1C | su.2C .
We prove the safety of checkX509Evidence in two steps: ﬁrst we show that the certiﬁcate
scheme is safe, Lemma 20, and then we show that the signature scheme is safe, Lemma 21.
Both proofs are reminiscent of the proof of Lemma 13. The ﬁrst lemma in our development
states some facts about our equational theory.
Lemma 19 (Normal forms with certiﬁcates). (1) Let  be a substitution ranging over two
forms of terms: either pk(sr ), or x509(sr , V1, V2, V3)with sr /∈ fn(V1, V2, V3) and dom()∩
(fv(V1, V2, V3)) = .
For each U in normal form with sr /∈ fn(U), there existsU ′ with sr /∈ fn(U ′),U ′ = U,
and U ′ in normal form.
(2) Let  be a substitution ranging over two forms of terms: either pk(su), or rsa-sha1
V, su) with su /∈ fn(V ).
For each U in normal form with su /∈ fn(U), there existsU ′ with su /∈ fn(U ′),U ′ = U,
and U ′ in normal form.
Proof. We prove the two parts in a similar fashion. As before, we write U → V for the
reduction relation obtained by orienting our equations on terms from left to right, and closing
under contexts.
(1) Suppose U reduces by a sequence of rewrite steps to V. We write → for a rewrite
step; so, U →n V . We prove, by induction on the number of rewrite steps n, that V is of
the formU ′ such that sr /∈ fn(U ′). As a corollary, ifV is the normal form ofU, then there
exists U ′ in normal form, sr /∈ fn(U ′), such that U ′ is V.
Base case: U is V, so, let U ′ be U.
Inductive hypothesis: U →k Uk, sr /∈ fn(Uk), and Uk → V . Then, Uk is C[L]
and V is C[R] where L → R is a rewrite rule. So, Uk is C′[L′], such that C is C′ and
L′ is L. If L′ matches L (L′ is L), then the redex occurs in Uk itself and V is Uk+1,
where Uk → Uk+1; so, let U ′ be Uk+1. Otherwise, L′matches L but L′ does not. By case
analysis on rewrite rules (L→R R), we ﬁnd all such L′:
• L′ is x509-user(x) and (x) is x509(sr , V1, V2, V3), sr /∈ fn(V1, V2, V3), x /∈ fv(V1,
V2, V3). Then C[L′] → C[V1], that is C′[V1], that is (C′[V1]) (since x /∈ fv(V1).
So, let U ′ be C′[V1].
• L′ is x509-alg(x) and(x) is x509(sr , V1, V2, V3), sr /∈ fn(V1, V2, V3), x /∈ fv(V1, V2,
V3). Same as previous case, with V2 instead of V1. So, let U ′ be C′[V2].
• L′ isx509-key(x) and(x) isx509(sr , V1, V2, V3), sr /∈ fn(V1, V2, V3),x /∈ fv(V1, V2,
V3). Same as previous case, with V3 instead of V2. So, let U ′ be C′[V3].
• L′ is check-x509( , y), (y) is pk(sr ). Then C[L′] → C[pk(sr )], that is (C′[y]).
So, let U ′ be C′[y].
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• L′ is check-rsa-sha1( , , y), (y) is pk(sr ). Then C[L′] → C[pk(sr )], that is
(C′[y]). So, let U ′ be C′[y].
• In all other cases, if L′ matches L, so does L′.
(2) Suppose U →n V . Again, we prove, by induction on the number of rewrite steps n,
that V is of the form U ′ such that su /∈ fn(U ′). As a corollary, if V is the normal form of
U, then there exists U ′ in normal form, su /∈ fn(U ′), such that U ′ is V.
Base case: U is V , so, let U ′ be U .
Inductive hypothesis: U →k Uk, su /∈ fn(Uk), and Uk → V . Then, Uk is C[L]
and V is C[R] where L → R is a rewrite rule. So, Uk is C′[L′], such that C is C′ and
L′ is L. If L′ matches L (L′ is L), then the redex occurs in Uk itself and V is Uk+1,
where Uk → Uk+1; so, let U ′ be Uk+1. Otherwise, L′matches L but L′ does not. By case
analysis on rewrite rules (L→R R), we ﬁnd all such L′:
• L′ is check-x509( , y), (y) is pk(su). Then C[L′] → C[pk(su)], that is (C′[y]).
So, let U ′ be C′[y].
• L′ is check-rsa-sha1( , , y), (y) is pk(su). Then C[L′] → C[pk(su)], that is
(C′[y]). So, let U ′ be C′[y].
• In all other cases, if L′ matches L, so does L′. 
Lemma 20 (isX509Cert is safe). Let C be an internal state with m0 sessions. Let ′ be
a substitution that ranges over open terms where the name sr does not appear such that

= ′ | 1C is closed. Let I be a safe collection of certiﬁcates. If
 isX509Cert(x, kr , w, rsa-sha1, k)
then there exists (V ,K) ∈ I such that (x,w, k = xv, V ,K).
Proof. Assume  isX509Cert(x, kr , w, rsa-sha1, k) and let ◦C be such that  = ′ |
◦C and ◦C ranges over closed terms in normal forms. Hence, dom(◦C) = dom(1C) =
{kr} ∪ {xV | (V ,K) ∈ I} and, for all x ∈ dom(C), x◦C = x1C .
From the deﬁnition of isX509Cert, and rewriting for kr , we get
 (check-x509(x,pk(sr )) = pk(sr )), (7)
 (w = x509-user(x)), (8)
 (k = x509-key(x)). (9)
Let N be the normal form of x . From (7), we get check-x509(N,pk(sr )) = pk(sr ), with
both terms in normal form. Using Lemma 12(5), cases (a) and (c) can be eliminated, since
check-x509 = pk andpk is a constructor. Soonly case (b) applies:check-x509(N,pk(sr ))
is a redex, and must match the (only) rule for check-x509: N = x509(sr , u′, a′, k′), that
is x  = x509(sr , u′, a′, k′).
Let T = x ′ in normal form; so, sr /∈ fn(T ) and x  = T ◦C . From the assumptions on I,
we have that the range of ◦C consists of pk(sr ) and terms of the form x509(sr , V1, V2, V3),
such that sr /∈ fn(V1, V2, V3) and dom(◦C) ∩ fv(V1, V2, V3) = . Using Lemma 19(1)
and the deﬁnition of ◦C , there exists T ′ in normal form, such that T ′ does not contain sr ,
T ′ ◦C = T ◦C , and T ′ ◦C is also in normal form.
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So, T ′ ◦C = x  = x509(sr , u′, a′, k′), and by plain structural matching on normal
forms, we obtain three cases for T:
• T = y for some y ∈ dom(◦C) such that y ◦C = x509(sr , , , ), where stands for
any subterm.
By deﬁnition of ◦C , this implies y = xV for some (V ,K) ∈ I, and thus (x = xV ).• T = x509(y, ) for some y ∈ dom(◦C) such that y ◦C = sr .
This is excluded by deﬁnition of ◦C .• T = x509(sr , ).
This is excluded by hypothesis on ′: since T = x ′, we have sr /∈ fn(T ).
So (x = xV ), for (V ,K) ∈ I. Using (8), 9, and the deﬁnition of xV in ◦C , we obtain
(w, k = V,K). 
Lemma 21 (checkX509Evidence is safe). Let C be an internal state with m0 sessions.
Let ′ be a substitution that ranges over open terms where the names sr , su do not appear
such that  = ′ | 1C | 2C is closed. Let I be a safe collection of certiﬁcates. If
 checkX509Evidence(kr , u,W, S, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei)
then there exists i < n such that (sv, si, b, ea, et, ei = svi, SIi, bi, eai, eti , eii).
Proof. Assume  checkX509Evidence(kr , u,W, S, x, sv, si, b, ea, et, ei) and let ◦C be
such that  = ′ | 1C | ◦C and ◦C ranges over closed terms in normal forms.
Then, by deﬁnition of , there exists ′′ with dom(′′) = {k, auri, turi} such that
 isX509Cert(x, kr , u, rsa-sha1, k)′′, (10)
 (sv = rsa-sha1(k, c14n(si)))′′, (11)
 isSigInfo(si,rsa-sha1, b, ea, et, ei)′′, (12)
 (ea = <action auri>S</>)′′, (13)
 (et = <to turi>W</>)′′. (14)
Using Lemma 20 and (10), we get (x, u, k = xV , V,K)′′ for some (V ,K) ∈ I. Using
the assumption on I, we get (K = ku).
In (11), using the deﬁnition of ku in 2C , and normalizing both sides of the equa-
tion, we get check-rsa-sha1(c14n(si′), sv′,pk(su)) = pk(su), where si′, sv′ are nor-
mal forms of si , sv . Using Lemma 12(5), cases (a) and (c) can be eliminated, since
check-rsa-sha1 = pk and pk is a constructor. So from case (b), check-rsa-sha1(c14n
(si′), sv′,pk(su)) must match the (only) rule for check-rsa-sha1: sv′ = rsa-sha1(c14n
(si′), su), that is sv  = rsa-sha1(c14n(si′), su).
Let T = sv ′ 1C in normal form; so, su /∈ fn(T ) and sv  = T ◦C .
Using Lemma 19(2) and the deﬁnition of ◦C , T ◦C = T ′ ◦C , for T ′ and T ′ ◦C in normal
form. So, T ′ ◦C = rsa-sha1(c14n(si′), su), with both terms in normal form, and by plain
structural matching on normal forms, we obtain three cases for T:
• T = y for some y ∈ dom(◦C) such that y ◦C = rsa-sha1( , su), where stands for
any subterm.
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By deﬁnition of ◦C , this implies y = svi for some i < n, and thus (sv = svi).• T = rsa-sha1( , y) for some y ∈ dom(◦C) such that y ◦C = su.
This is excluded by deﬁnition of ◦C .• T = rsa-sha1( , su).
This is excluded by hypothesis on ′: since T = x ′, we have su /∈ fn(T ).
Using the deﬁnition of svi in C , Eq. (6) becomes
rsa-sha1(c14n(si ), su) = rsa-sha1(c14n(SIi ), su)
and thus Lemma 12(4) yields (si = SIi).
Similarly, expanding the deﬁnition of isSigInfo in (12) and in SIi , we obtain an equation
of the form:
W {x = b}{y = ea}{z = et}{w = ei}
= W {x = bi}{y = eai}{z = eti}{w = eii}
for a termW built only from constructors, and obtain (b, ea, et, ei = bi, eai, eti , eii) from
Lemma 12(4). 
Theorem 22. For any safe Envelope and any safe collection of certiﬁcates I, the conﬁgu-
ration Q is robustly safe.
Proof. The proof has the same structure as in Section 4.4. We rely here on a different
deﬁnition of i and checkEvidence, whose correctness is established in Lemma 21. We
easily establish the counterpart of Lemma 10
We check that the proofs of Lemmas 14, 15, 11 and the main proof of Theorem 8 apply
unchanged to our modiﬁed deﬁnitions. 
4.7. Stating and proving ﬁrewall-based authentication
For the ﬁrewall-based protocol, we deﬁne the full protocol conﬁgurations as follows.
Firewall protocol conﬁgurations: Q (param. by Envelopeu,Envelopef ,I)
Q = AI | initf .
(
su.
(
{u = principal(su)} | Iu | Sfu
)
| Kuf
)
| Sf
AI
= sr .
(
{kr = pk(sr )} |∏(V ,K)∈I{xV = x509(sr , V ,rsa-sha1,K)}
)
Iu
= !initu(n, t, b).(begin〈u n t b〉 | httpu〈Envelopeu〉)
S
f
u
= !httpu(e). ﬁlter hasUserSignedBody(e, u, su, n, t, b) → n, t, b in
endu〈u n t b〉 | initf 〈u, n, t, b〉
Kuf
= sf .
({f = principal(sf )} | {kf = pk(sf )} | If )
If
= !initf (u, n, t, b).(beginf 〈u n t b〉 | httpf 〈Envelopef 〉)
Sf
= !httpf (e). ﬁlter hasX509SignedBodyFw(e, kr , f, u′, n, t, b) → u′, n, t, b in
end〈u′ n t b〉
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This conﬁguration is obtained by merging those of Sections 4.3 and 4.6: up to indexing,
Iu and Suf are the same as for password-based signature (Section 4.3). AI is deﬁned as
in Section 4.6; Kuf and I
u
f are similar to Ku and Iu in that section: the main difference is
that the originator (u) received on initf is used instead of the immediate sender (f). Sf is
similar to Su in Section 4.6: they differ mostly in the content of the signature. We adapt the
deﬁnition of safe X.509-signed envelopes accordingly:
Safe envelopes with X.509 signing (adapted for Firewall)
A safe envelope is a term of the form Envelopef = T for some terms T,
SI, and FW such that sr , sf /∈ fn(T ) ∪ fn(SI), isSigInfo(SI,rsa-sha1, b, FW) and
isFirewallHeader(FW, u, n, t) are valid, with the active substitution  deﬁned by:

= {sv = rsa-sha1(c14n(SI), su)}
Wealso adapt the deﬁnition of safe collections of certiﬁcates to guarantee a unique certiﬁcate
for (f, kf ) instead of (u, ku).
Lemma 23. For any safe envelope and any safe collection of certiﬁcates I, the adapted
X.509 protocol conﬁguration: Q′ = AI | Kuf {beginf = begin} | Sf is robustly safe.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the main proof of Section 4.6; we use variables
u, n, t, b instead of b, ea, et, ei to represent arbitrary terms received on initf then signed.
The main difference is in showing that if
•  isSigInfo(SI,rsa-sha1, b1, FW1),  isFirewallHeader(FW1, u1, n1, t1),
•  isSigInfo(SI,rsa-sha1, b2, FW2),  isFirewallHeader(FW2, u2, n2, t2),
then (b1, u1, n1, t1 = b2, u2, n2, t2). 
Lemma 24. Let  be the event renaming {begin, endu, beginf , end = beginu, begin, end,
endf }. The conﬁguration Q is robustly safe.
Proof. Let Q◦ be Q with initf 〈u, n, t, b〉 replaced by the messages beginf 〈u n t b〉 |
httpf 〈Envelopef 〉 in Sfu . Since messages sent on initf are exclusively received by If , we
obtain Q◦ ≈ Q using a standard observational equivalence in the pi calculus.
We remark thatQ◦ ≡ C[end〈u, n, t, b〉 | begin〈u, n, t, b〉] for some contextC[-]where
the channels begin and end do not occur, and easily establish that any conﬁguration with
this structural property is robustly safe. 
Theorem 25. For any safe envelopes (Envelopeu,Envelopef ) for password-based signing
and adapted X.509 signing, respectively, and for any certiﬁcates safe collection of certiﬁ-
cates I, the conﬁguration endu, beginf .Q is robustly safe.
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Proof. Relying on Lemma 16, we compose Lemma 18 with the renaming {accept = initf }
in evaluation context, Lemmas 24 and 23 in evaluation context. 
5. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we introduced a framework for reasoning about the security of SOAP proto-
cols and their cryptographic implementations in terms ofWS-Security tokens.We illustrated
our framework using a series of simple authentication protocols. Surprisingly, perhaps, these
XML-based protocols can be studied at the same (syntactic) level of abstraction:
• formally, using a faithful, predicate-based implementation in the applied pi calculus with
proofs of correspondence properties against a Dolev–Yao adversary;
• experimentally, using sample programs and SOAP traces on top of theWSE toolkit [30].
This should provide a principled basis for testing compliant implementations, and also
reduce the risk of attacks in concrete reﬁnements of correct, abstract protocols.
As can be expected, this also complicates the formal model, with for example a large
syntax and equational theory for terms in the applied pi calculus. However, our experi-
ence suggests that a modular deﬁnition of predicates, together with standard compositional
techniques in the pi calculus, should enable a good reuse of the proof effort for numerous
WS-Security protocols.
Our choice of authentication protocols stresses that small variations in WS-Security en-
velope formats may lead to much weaker correspondence properties. Each service should
therefore clearly prescribe (and enforce) the intended property. Speciﬁcally, a prudent prac-
tice in the selection of XML signatures is to request that all potentially relevant headers be
jointly authenticated—not just the message identiﬁer or its body. In the case authentication
relies on username tokens, this strongly suggests the use of a signature instead of a digest.
Moreover, XML signatures have a complex structure, which should be used with caution.
Speciﬁcally, authentication should not rely on signed elementswhose interpretation depends
on an unsigned context.
5.1. Related work
There have been many formal studies of remote procedure call (RPC) security mecha-
nisms. The earliest we are aware of is the formalization within the BAN logic [12] of Secure
RPC [37] in theAndrew distributed computing environment. More recently, process calculi
[3] have been used to formalize the secure implementation of programming abstractions
such as communication channels and network objects [40].
We are aware of very little prior formal work on XML security protocols. Gordon and
Pucella [23] implement and verify attribute-driven SOAP-level security protocols, but do
not use the WS-Security syntax. Their representation of SOAP messages abstracts many
details of the XML wire format, and hence would be blind to any errors in the detailed
structure of names or signatures. Damiani et al. [15] describe an access control model
for SOAP messages, but rely on a secure transport rather than WS-Security; a subsequent
paper [16] discusses connections between SOAP security and authorization languages such
as SAML and XACML.
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5.2. Future work
Our approach to authenticity properties should extend to complementary security proper-
ties, such as secrecy and anonymity. Similarly, we should be able to deal with more complex
protocols (with series of related messages) and conﬁgurations (with more principals and
roles). Our predicate structure is quite modular, with predicates being re-used in different
protocols. Hence, we are hopeful that the method will scale up. Moreover, our seman-
tics is suitable for automation, and we have recently built a tool TulaFale [7] that allows
us to construct authentication and secrecy proofs automatically using Blanchet’s Proverif
tool [8].
At this stage, we are exploring the range ofWS-Security protocols, rather than attempting
its thorough description. Our fragment of WS-Security omits certain features and options
such as encryption, Kerberos tokens, and XPath transforms, but we see no fundamental
barrier to modelling all of the speciﬁcation.
Finally, although all the protocols are implemented usingWSE, our goal has not been to
verify the WSE implementation itself. There is an informal gap between our formal model
and the actual implementation: we have not mechanically checked that our predicates cor-
respond correctly to the checks made byWSE. Still, we are investigating ways of verifying
at least parts of the implementation by relating it to our semantics.
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Appendix A. The applied pi calculus (overview)
The applied pi calculus is a simple, general extension of the pi calculus with value
passing, primitive function symbols, and equations between terms. Abadi and Fournet [1],
introduce this calculus, develop semantics and proof techniques, and apply those techniques
in reasoning about some security protocols. This appendix gives only a brief overview
derived from [2].
In the applied pi calculus, the constructs of the classic pi calculus can be used to represent
concurrent systems that communicate on channels, and function symbols can be used to
represent cryptographic operations and other operations on data. Large classes of important
attacks can also be expressed in the applied pi calculus, as contexts. These include the typical
attacks for which a symbolic, mostly “black-box” view of cryptography sufﬁces (but not for
example some lower-level attacks that depend on timing behaviour or dictionary attacks).
Some of the properties of the protocol can be nicely captured in the form of equivalences
between processes. Moreover, some of the properties are sensitive to the equations satisﬁed
by the cryptographic functions upon which the protocol relies. The applied pi calculus is
well-suited for expressing those equivalences and those equations.
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Abstractly, a signature 	 consists of a ﬁnite set of function symbols, such as concat
and sha1, each with an integer arity. Given a signature 	, an inﬁnite set of names, and an
inﬁnite set of variables, the set of terms is deﬁned by the grammar
Grammar for terms
T ,U, V, SI,Envelope ::= terms
begin, end, http, init, c, s name (for communication channels)
spwd, sr , su name (for cryptographic secrets)
b, e, n, x, y, t, u variable
f (T1, . . . , Tl) function application
where f ranges over the function symbols of	 and lmatches the arity of f.We use metavari-
ables v and w to range over both names and variables.
The grammar for processes is similar to the one in the pi calculus, except that messages
can contain terms (rather than only names) and that names need not be just channel names:
Grammar for processes
P,Q,R ::= processes (or plain processes)
0 null process
P | Q parallel composition
!P replication
s.P name restriction (“new”)
if U = V then P elseQ conditional
v(x).P message input
v〈T 〉.P message output
The null process 0 does nothing;P | Q is the parallel composition ofP andQ; the replication
!P behaves as an inﬁnite number of copies ofP running in parallel. The process s.P makes a
new name s then behaves asP. The conditional construct ifU = V thenP elseQ is standard,
but we should stress that U = V represents equality in the equational theory, rather than
strict syntactic identity. We abbreviate it if U = V then P when Q is 0. Finally, the input
process v(x).P is ready to input from channel v, then to run P with the actual message
replaced for the formal parameter x, while the output process v〈T 〉.P is ready to output
message T on channel v, then to run P. In both of these, we may omit P when it is 0.
When (Pi)i∈I is a ﬁnite set of processes indexed by I = 1 . . . m, we write ∏i∈I Pi as an
abbreviation for P1 | . . . | Pm (with∏i∈ Pi = 0).
Further, we extend processes with active substitutions:
Grammar for extended processes
A,B,C, I,K, S ::= extended processes
P plain process
A | B parallel composition
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n.A name restriction
s.A variable restriction
{x = T } active substitution
We write {x = T } for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term T. The
substitution {x = T } typically appears when the term T has been sent to the environ-
ment, but the environment may not have the atomic names that appear in T; the variable x
is just a way to refer to T in this situation. The substitution {x = T } is active in the
sense that it “ﬂoats” and applies to any process that comes into contact with it. In order
to control this contact, we may add a variable restriction: x.({x = T } | P) corresponds
exactly to let x = T in P . Although the substitution {x = T } concerns only one vari-
able, we can build bigger substitutions by parallel composition. We always assume that
our substitutions are cycle-free. We also assume that, in an extended process, there is
at most one substitution for each variable, and there is exactly one when the variable is
restricted.
A frame is an extended process built up from active substitutions by parallel compo-
sition and restriction. Informally, frames represent the static knowledge gathered by the
environment after communications with an extended process. An evaluation context E[-]
is an extended process with a hole in the place of an extended process. As usual, names
and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. When X
is any expression, f v(X) and fn(X) are the sets of free variables and free names of X,
respectively.
We rely on a sort system for terms and extended processes [1, Section 2]. We always
assume that terms and extended processes are well-sorted and that substitutions and context
applications preserve sorts.
Given a signature 	, we equip it with an equational theory (that is, with an equivalence
relation on terms with certain closure properties). We write simply U = V to mean the
terms U and V are related by the equational theory associated with 	.
Structural equivalences, written A ≡ B, relate extended processes that are equal by any
capture-avoiding rearrangements of parallel compositions, restrictions, and active substitu-
tions, and by equational rewriting of any terms in processes.
Reductions, written A→ B, represent steps of computation (in particular, internal mes-
sage transmissions and branching on conditionals). Reductions are closed by structural
equivalence, hence by equational rewriting on terms.
Observational equivalences, written A ≈ B, relate extended processes that cannot be
distinguished by any evaluation context in the applied pi calculus, with any combination
of messaging and term comparisons. (We let ≈ be the largest weak bisimulation on ex-
tended processes for reductions that preserves all potential observation of input or out-
put on free names and that is closed by application of evaluation contexts [1].) Strong
equivalence, written A ∼ B, is a ﬁner, auxiliary equivalence similarly deﬁned by con-
sidering strong bisimulation and immediate observations. The applied pi calculus has a
useful, general theory of observational equivalence, parameterized by 	 and its equational
theory [1].
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Appendix B. Additional proofs
We gather here proofs and additional lemmas that deal with internal choices, formula
implementations, and logical equivalence in applied pi. These developments are not speciﬁc
to the protocols considered in the paper.
B.1. Properties of internal choice
We begin by elaborating the co-inductive deﬁnition of internal choice given in the body
of the paper. Let a binary relation S between processes and sets of processes be a choice-
relation if and only if P S X implies (1) if Q ∈ X then P →∗∼ Q; (2) if P → P ′, then
either (a) P ′ ∼ Q for some Q ∈ X or (b) P ′ S X′ for some X′ ⊆ X; and (3) P does not
communicate on free channel names.
Let S⊕ be the union of all choice-relations. In effect, Section 4.1 takes
⊕
X to be the
greatest choice-relation. By standard, simple arguments, the union of all choice-relations is
in fact the greatest choice-relation. Hence, we have that P ∈⊕X if and only if P S⊕ X.
Next, we present some useful lemmas concerning internal choice.
Lemma 26. If P ∼ Q andQ ∈⊕X then P ∈⊕X.
Proof. This follows easily by deﬁnition of bisimilarity, ∼, and internal choice. 
In our implementations, it is convenient to identify reduction steps that are deterministic,
such as term comparisons; we introduce the relation→d for these reduction steps. For the
next lemma, we only need to assume that → and →d commute, that is, P →d Q and
P → P ′ implies either P ′ = Q or the existence ofQ′ with P ′ →d Q′ andQ→ Q′.
Lemma 27. If P →d Q andQ ∈⊕X then P ∈⊕X.
Proof. This follows easily by deﬁnition of P →d Q and internal choice. 
Lemma 28. If Pi ∈⊕Xi for all i ∈ I then⊕{Pi | i ∈ I } ⊆⊕⋃{Xi | i ∈ I }.
Proof. Assume Pi ∈⊕Xi for all i ∈ I .
Let P S X just if P ∈⊕{Pj | j ∈ J } and X =⋃{Xj | j ∈ J } for some J ⊆ I .
The lemma follows if the relation S ∪ S⊕ is a choice-relation, for then we have that
S ⊆ S⊕, and therefore that P S⊕ ⋃{Xi | i ∈ I } for all P ∈ ⊕{Pi | i ∈ I }, that is,⊕{Pi | i ∈ I } ⊆⊕⋃{Xi | i ∈ I }.
To see that S∪S⊕ is a choice-relation it sufﬁces to consider any P ∈⊕{Pj | j ∈ J } and
X =⋃{Xj | j ∈ J } for some J ⊆ I , and to establish the three conditions in the deﬁnition
of a choice-relation.
(1) Consider any Q ∈ X so that Q ∈ Xj for some j ∈ J . By assumption, Pj ∈⊕Xj ,
and therefore Pj →∗∼ Q. Since P ∈⊕{Pj | j ∈ J }, we have P →∗∼ Pj , and therefore,
by bisimilarity, P →∗∼ Q.
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(2) Suppose P → P ′. Since P ∈⊕{Pj | j ∈ J }, either (a) P ′ ∼ Pj for some j ∈ J or
(b) P ′ ∈⊕{Pj | j ∈ J ′} for some J ′ ⊆ J . In case (a), P ′ ∼ Pj ∈⊕Xj so P ′ ∈⊕Xj
by Lemma 26, and hence we have case (b), P ′ S⊕ Xj with Xj ⊆ X. In case (b), we have
case (b), P ′ S ⋃{Xj | j ∈ J ′} ⊆ X since J ′ ⊆ J ⊆ I .
(3) From P ∈ ⊕{Pj | j ∈ J } it follows that P does not communicate on free channel
names.
Hence, S ∪ S⊕ is a choice-relation, and the lemma follows. 
B.2. Properties of formula implementation
We state some basic facts concerning the implementation of a predicate , with bound
variables y˜, as a process ﬁlter  → y˜ in P . The following may be proved by inductions on
the deﬁnitions of the ﬁlters.
Lemma 29. (1) fv(ﬁlter  → y˜ in P) ⊆ (fv() ∪ fv(P )) \ {y˜}.
(2) fn( ﬁlter  → y˜ in P) ⊆ fn() ∪ fn(P ).
(3) ( ﬁlter  → y˜ inQ) = ﬁlter  → y˜ inQ when y˜ do not occur in .
Next, the main property of formula implementation to be proved here is Lemma 5.
Restatement of Lemma 5. If ﬁlter  → y˜ in P is deﬁned and closed then:
ﬁlter  → y˜ in P ∈ ⊕{P {y˜ = V˜ } | f v(V˜ ) =  ∧  {y˜ = V˜ }}.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the deﬁnition of ﬁlter  → y˜ in P . Since ﬁlter  →
y˜ in P is deﬁned and closed, Lemma 29 implies we may assume that fv(P ) ⊆ y˜ and that
fv() = y˜. We proceed by cases on the structure of .
• In case  = (V = T ), we are to showQ ∈⊕X, where
Q = let y˜ = S˜{x = V } in if V = T then P ,
X = ⊕{P {y˜ = V˜ } | f v(V˜ ) =  ∧ (V = T ){y˜ = V˜ }},
when f v(T ) = y˜, f v(V ) = , f v(P ) ⊆ y˜, and V = T → y˜ with inverse terms S˜.
We consider two cases: either there are V˜ such that T {y˜ = V˜ } = V , or not. In the ﬁrst
case, by clause (2) of the deﬁnition of V = T → y˜, we have V˜ = S˜{x = V }, and
therefore the vector V˜ is unique. We have:
Q = if V = T {y˜ = S˜{x = V }} then P {y˜ = S˜{x = V }}
= if V = T {y˜ = V˜ } then P {y˜ = V˜ }
→d P {y˜ = V˜ },
X = {P {y˜ = V˜ } | f v(V˜ ) =  ∧ T {y˜ = V˜ } = V }
= {P {y˜ = V˜ }}.
In the second case, when there are no V˜ such that T {y˜ = V˜ } = V , we have
Q →∗d if V = T {y˜ = S˜{x = V }} then P {y˜ = S˜{x = V }} ∼ 0,
X =  .
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Using Lemmas 26 and 27, we can establishQ ∈⊕X in both cases.
• In case  = (x ∈ V ) and y˜ = {x}, we are to showQ ∈⊕X where
Q = ﬁlter x ∈ V → x in P,
X = {P {x = U} | (V = U1 . . . Ui U V ′) for some U1, …, Ui , U, V ′, i0},
when f v(V ) =  and f v(P ) ⊆ {x}. Now, by appeal to Lemma 12, the normal form of
the closed term V must take the form V = V1 . . . Vm W where m0 and V1, …, Vm,
W are closed, normal terms, andW = W1 W2 for any W1, W2. We calculate as follows,
where R = s(z).ﬁlter z=h t → h, t in (c〈h〉 | s〈t〉).
Q = ﬁlter x ∈ V1 · · ·Vm W → x in P
= s, c.(c(x).P | s〈V1 · · ·Vm W 〉 | !R)
→ 2nd s, c.(c(x).P | c〈V1〉 | . . . | c〈Vm〉 | s〈W 〉 | !R)→ 2d ∼ c.(c(x).P | c〈V1〉 | . . . | c〈Vm〉)∈ ⊕{P {x = Vi} | i ∈ 1 . . . m}
= ⊕X.
By Lemmas 26 and 27,Q ∈⊕X follows.
• In case  = p(W˜), we are to showQ ∈⊕⋃{Xi | i ∈ 1 . . . m} where
Q = s.(s〈〉 |∏i∈1...m s( ).ﬁlter i {˜x = W˜ } → y˜, z˜i in P),
Xi = {P {y˜ = V˜ } | fv(U˜ , V˜ ) =  ∧  i {˜x = W˜ }{˜zi = U˜}{y˜ = V˜ }}
when f v(W˜ ) = y˜, f v(P ) ⊆ y˜, and p(˜x) :- 1 ∨ · · · ∨ m and, for all i ∈ 1 . . . m,
f v(i ) = x˜ unionmulti z˜i and (f v(W˜ ) ∪ f v(P )) ∩ z˜i = . By examining the m possible
transitions of Q, we clearly haveQ ∈⊕{Pi | i ∈ 1 . . . m}, where:
Pi = ﬁlter i {˜x = W˜ } → y˜, z˜i in P.
By induction hypothesis, for each i ∈ 1 . . . m,Pi ∈⊕Xi . Hence,⊕{Pi | i ∈ 1 . . . m} ⊆⊕⋃{Xi | i ∈ 1 . . . m}, by Lemma 28, and henceQ ∈⊕⋃{Xi | i ∈ 1 . . . m}.
• In case  = 1,2, we are to showQ ∈⊕X where
Q = ﬁlter 1 → y˜1 in (ﬁlter 2 → y˜2 in P)
X = {P {y˜1, y˜2 = V˜1, V˜2} |
 1{y˜1 = V˜1} ∧  2{y˜1, y˜2 = V˜1, V˜2} ∧ f v(V˜1, V˜2) = },
when f v(P ) ⊆ y˜, f v(1,2) = y˜, y˜1 = y˜ ∩ f v(1), and y˜2 = y˜ \ f v(1), so that
y˜ = y˜1 unionmulti y˜2. By induction hypothesis,Q ∈⊕{PV˜1 | V˜1 ∈ I } where
PV˜1 = ﬁlter 2{y˜1 = V˜1} → y˜2 in (P {y˜1 = V˜1})
I = {V˜1 | f v(V˜1) =  ∧  1{y˜1 = V˜1}}.
By induction hypothesis, PV˜1 ∈
⊕
XV˜1 , for each V˜1 ∈ I , where
XV˜1 = {P {y˜1, y˜2 = V˜1, V˜2} | V˜2 ∈ JV˜1},
JV˜1 = {V˜2 | f v(V˜2) =  ∧  2{y˜1, y˜2 = V˜1, V˜2}}.
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Hence, with Lemma 28, we have
Q ∈ ⊕{PV˜1 | V˜1 ∈ I }⊆ ⊕⋃{XV˜1 | V˜1 ∈ I }= ⊕{P {y˜1, y˜2 = V˜1, V˜2} | V˜1 ∈ I, V˜2 ∈ JV˜1}= ⊕X.
This completes all the cases of the induction. 
B.3. Properties of logical equivalence
We extend our deﬁnition of occurrence from events to sets of events as follows: we
write AL when L = {a〈V 〉 | A a〈V 〉}. We can formulate robust safety (and other
safety properties) using these observable sets: A is robustly safe if and only if, whenever
E[A] →∗ L,E[-] does not bind the channels of L, and end〈V 〉 ∈ L, then also begin〈V 〉 ∈
L.
For a given set of processes X, the processes in
⊕
X are not necessarily observationally
equivalent (as they may commit to different subsets of X). Still, we can substitute Q for P
with P,Q ∈⊕X without changing global set observations:
Lemma 30. Internal choice implementations do not affect observations A→∗ L.
Proof. In this proof, we say that two processes are related when they differ only on their
implementation of internal choices: A and B are related when A = F [S˜], B = F [S˜′] for
somem-ary contextF [-] and there existsXi with Si, S′i ∈
⊕
Xi for each i ∈ 1 . . . m. (More
general forms with nested internal choices are handled by transitivity.)
For any reduction step A→ A′, one of the following holds:
(1) A ≡ E[S] for some X and S ∈⊕X, and
(a) A′ ∼ E[P ] for some P ∈ X (completion step); or
(b) A′ ≡ E[S′] for some Y ⊆ X and S′ ∈⊕Y (internal step).
(2) A→ A′ does not depend on internal choice implementations (external step).
Internal and completion steps for different internal choices commute with one another, and
internal steps commute with any external steps. Besides, condition (3) on internal choices
implies that internal choices (and thus internal steps) never directly affect observations
AL.
Assume A and B are related. For any given L, we show that, if there exists A′ such that
A→∗ A′L, then there exists B ′ such that B →∗ B ′L, by induction on the number of
completion steps in A→∗ A′.
Base case (No completion step): By reordering reductions A →∗ A′, we obtain some
A1 with external steps A →∗ A1 and internal steps A1 →∗ A′. There exist external steps
B →∗ B1 in direct correspondence with A →∗ A1 for some B1 related to A1. Finally,
A′L implies A1L, and we can conclude using B →∗ B1L.
Inductive case: By reordering reductions A→∗ A′, we obtain
A→∗≡ EA[SA] →∗→ EA[P ′] →∗≡ A′,
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where EA[-] is an evaluation context, X is a set of processes, and SA ∈ ⊕X, P ∈ X,
and P ′ ∼ P are processes with external steps A →∗ EA[SA], internal steps and a ﬁrst
completion step SA →∗→ P ′, and any steps EA[P ′] →∗≡ A′.
By deﬁnition of external step, we also have external steps B →∗ EB [SB ] such that
EA[SA] and EB [SB ] are related, for some SB ∈⊕X and evaluation context EB [-].
By condition (1) on internal choice SB , there exist P ′′ ∼ P with reductions SB →∗ P ′′,
and thusEB [SB ] →∗ EB [P ′′]withEB [P ′′] ∼ EB [P ′]. The processesEB [P ′] andEA[P ′]
are related, hence, by induction hypothesis, EA[P ′] →∗ A′L implies EB [P ′] →∗ L
and ﬁnally B →∗ L. 
Next, we show that one can replace a formula by another (implementable) equivalent
one without affecting set observations. This is useful to decompose message processing, as
detailed in Section 4.4.
Lemma 31. If A and B are logically equivalent and A→∗ L, then B →∗ L.
Proof. This is Lemma 30 applied to the internal choices obtained by Lemma 5. 
Given the deﬁnition of robust safety, Lemma 7 now follows as a corollary.
Restatement of Lemma 7. Logical equivalence preserves robust safety.
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